<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?><?xml-stylesheet href="http://www.blogger.com/styles/atom.css" type="text/css"?><feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom' xmlns:openSearch='http://a9.com/-/spec/opensearchrss/1.0/' xmlns:georss='http://www.georss.org/georss' xmlns:gd='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005' xmlns:thr='http://purl.org/syndication/thread/1.0'><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303</id><updated>2012-02-15T16:41:22.085Z</updated><category term='pricing'/><category term='oil'/><category term='business'/><category term='finance'/><category term='Market'/><category term='competition'/><category term='liquidity'/><category term='Econometrics'/><category term='risk'/><category term='game'/><category term='bubble'/><category term='regulation'/><category term='bank'/><category term='innovation'/><category term='credit'/><category term='hedge'/><category term='house'/><category term='fx finance'/><category term='governance'/><category term='china'/><category term='debt'/><category term='equity'/><category term='exchange'/><category term='fx'/><category term='noise'/><category term='fx information'/><category term='merger'/><category term='money'/><title type='text'>Robo</title><subtitle type='html'>This blog is mainly a personal storage site for articles and papers that interest me.  They will mainly be about financial markets, current policy issues and  articles that relate to these topics.  

Have fun!</subtitle><link rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#feed' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/posts/default'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default?max-results=100'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/'/><link rel='hub' href='http://pubsubhubbub.appspot.com/'/><link rel='next' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default?start-index=101&amp;max-results=100'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><generator version='7.00' uri='http://www.blogger.com'>Blogger</generator><openSearch:totalResults>659</openSearch:totalResults><openSearch:startIndex>1</openSearch:startIndex><openSearch:itemsPerPage>100</openSearch:itemsPerPage><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-4788548736481908961</id><published>2012-02-15T16:41:00.000Z</published><updated>2012-02-15T16:41:22.096Z</updated><title type='text'>Are Credit Ratings Massively Overrated? | Economics Intelligence</title><content type='html'>&lt;div&gt;The informational content of credit rating agencies seems to be minimal - worse than a simple indicator that can be constructed. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;a href="http://economicsintelligence.com/2012/02/07/are-credit-ratings-massively-overrated/"&gt;Are Credit Ratings Massively Overrated? | Economics Intelligence&lt;/a&gt;: &lt;blockquote&gt;"Hilscher and Wilson reply that they do not claim that ratings have no informational content whatsoever. Having a S&amp;amp;P rating was certainly better than no information at all, stresses Hilscher"&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a style="font-size:13px" href="https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/pengoopmcjnbflcjbmoeodbmoflcgjlk"&gt;'via Blog this'&lt;/a&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-4788548736481908961?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/4788548736481908961/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=4788548736481908961' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/4788548736481908961'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/4788548736481908961'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2012/02/are-credit-ratings-massively-overrated.html' title='Are Credit Ratings Massively Overrated? | Economics Intelligence'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-2243359756795080848</id><published>2012-01-08T13:55:00.000Z</published><updated>2012-01-08T13:55:59.905Z</updated><title type='text'>Do hedge funds offer value for their fees? No - FT.com</title><content type='html'>&lt;div&gt;Not surprising if the absolute returns are from finding inefficiencies.  Given an absolute amount of inefficiencies, these are shared over more funds.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c68c0250-379f-11e1-a5e0-00144feabdc0.html?ftcamp=rss#axzz1iqtLLomQ"&gt;Do hedge funds offer value for their fees? No - FT.com&lt;/a&gt;: &lt;blockquote&gt;"Just as individual hedge funds tend to do better when they are small, so too, his analysis shows, the industry as a whole performed better when it was a largely unknown $200bn business, rather than the high profile $1.9tn industry it had grown to become, before the financial crisis in 2008 so dramatically exposed some of its shortcomings. The comforting compounded rates of return reported in hedge fund indices give a misleading impression of the actual cash returns achieved by hedge fund investors. Most of the client money that has flowed in since the industry began to be institutionalised has not achieved anything like the returns the long-term headline index figures suggest.&lt;br /&gt;"&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a style="font-size:13px" href="https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/pengoopmcjnbflcjbmoeodbmoflcgjlk"&gt;'via Blog this'&lt;/a&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-2243359756795080848?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/2243359756795080848/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=2243359756795080848' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/2243359756795080848'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/2243359756795080848'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2012/01/do-hedge-funds-offer-value-for-their.html' title='Do hedge funds offer value for their fees? No - FT.com'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-1528548433308332708</id><published>2012-01-02T13:03:00.000Z</published><updated>2012-01-02T13:03:14.152Z</updated><title type='text'>Delete rows from R data frame « Heuristic Andrew</title><content type='html'>&lt;div&gt;Use for getting rid of rows of data where there is no response.  For instance, the missing values in a large dataframe can be removed in this way with simplicity. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;a href="http://heuristically.wordpress.com/2009/10/08/delete-rows-from-r-data-frame/"&gt;Delete rows from R data frame « Heuristic Andrew&lt;/a&gt;:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a style="font-size:13px" href="https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/pengoopmcjnbflcjbmoeodbmoflcgjlk"&gt;'via Blog this'&lt;/a&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-1528548433308332708?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/1528548433308332708/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=1528548433308332708' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/1528548433308332708'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/1528548433308332708'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2012/01/delete-rows-from-r-data-frame-heuristic.html' title='Delete rows from R data frame « Heuristic Andrew'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-1751663209193646073</id><published>2011-12-24T07:30:00.000Z</published><updated>2011-12-24T07:30:37.345Z</updated><title type='text'>Friedman and Krugman</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/23/new-frontiers-in-economic-barbarism/"&gt;New Frontiers in Economic Barbarism - NYTimes.com&lt;/a&gt;: "Quite. What Matt may not know, however, is that this is a classic argument in international macro, and the person who made it best was …. drumroll … Milton Friedman. Here’s a snip from Friedman’s 1953 essay “The case for flexible exchange rates”:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Is it really possible that people at the University of Chicago have unlearned not only Keynes but Friedman? Alas, yes."&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a style="font-size:13px" href="https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/pengoopmcjnbflcjbmoeodbmoflcgjlk"&gt;'via Blog this'&lt;/a&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-1751663209193646073?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/1751663209193646073/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=1751663209193646073' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/1751663209193646073'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/1751663209193646073'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2011/12/friedman-and-krugman.html' title='Friedman and Krugman'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-6412572295379448472</id><published>2011-12-04T12:48:00.000Z</published><updated>2011-12-04T12:48:21.635Z</updated><title type='text'>Cross Validation</title><content type='html'>A number of related ideas about the cross validation of models: &lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;a href="http://projecteuclid.org/DPubS/Repository/1.0/Disseminate?view=body&amp;amp;id=pdfview_1&amp;amp;handle=euclid.ssu/1268143839"&gt;Arlot paper on cross validation&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;a href="http://robjhyndman.com/researchtips/crossvalidation/"&gt;Rob Hyndman&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.r-bloggers.com/comparing-model-selection-methods/"&gt;R code for comparison&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-6412572295379448472?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/6412572295379448472/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=6412572295379448472' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/6412572295379448472'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/6412572295379448472'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2011/12/cross-validation.html' title='Cross Validation'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-6769203125666162620</id><published>2011-11-19T20:01:00.000Z</published><updated>2011-11-19T20:01:14.265Z</updated><title type='text'>Why Only Germany Can Fix the Euro | Foreign Affairs</title><content type='html'>&lt;div&gt;At the heart of the Euro area crisis. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136685/matthias-matthijs-and-mark-blyth/why-only-germany-can-fix-the-euro?fb_ref=.TsbQxQCAv3M.like&amp;amp;fb_source=home_multiline"&gt;Why Only Germany Can Fix the Euro | Foreign Affairs&lt;/a&gt;: &lt;blockquote&gt;" According to Eurostat, Germany's trade surplus with the rest of the EU grew from 46.4 billion euro in 2000 to 126.5 billion in 2007. The evolution of Germany's bilateral trade surpluses with the Mediterranean countries is especially revealing. Between 2000 and 2007, Greece's annual trade deficit with Germany grew from 3 billion euro to 5.5 billion, Italy's doubled, from 9.6 billion to 19.6 billion, Spain's almost tripled, from 11 billion to 27.2 billion, and Portugal's quadrupled, from 1 billion to 4.2 billion. Between 2001 and 2009, moreover, Germany saw its final total consumption fall from 78.5 percent of GDP to 74.5 percent. Its gross savings rate increased from less than 19 percent of GDP to almost 26 percent over the same period."&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a style="font-size:13px" href="https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/pengoopmcjnbflcjbmoeodbmoflcgjlk"&gt;'via Blog this'&lt;/a&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-6769203125666162620?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/6769203125666162620/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=6769203125666162620' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/6769203125666162620'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/6769203125666162620'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2011/11/why-only-germany-can-fix-euro-foreign.html' title='Why Only Germany Can Fix the Euro | Foreign Affairs'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-5918678471690683586</id><published>2011-11-18T19:31:00.000Z</published><updated>2011-11-18T19:31:07.454Z</updated><title type='text'>Unintended consequences</title><content type='html'>The unintended consequences of trying to reduce the Greek debt burden while preventing the triggering of CDS has the unintended consequence of making all bond positions look vulnerable (even when there was a previous CDS protection.  The FT quotes  &lt;a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0388f8be-1204-11e1-8ab1-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1dWdf0Ucf"&gt;Commerzbank chief a&lt;/a&gt;: &lt;blockquote&gt;"Mr Blessing criticised the Greek agreement since investors that insured Greek bonds using CDS had not received a pay-out because the voluntary agreement was not deemed to be a so-called “credit event” and thus did not trigger CDS payments."&lt;/blockquote&gt;This can lead to other bond holders selling the bonds because they find that they are not protected from default. &lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a style="font-size:13px" href="https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/pengoopmcjnbflcjbmoeodbmoflcgjlk"&gt;'via Blog this'&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-5918678471690683586?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/5918678471690683586/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=5918678471690683586' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/5918678471690683586'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/5918678471690683586'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2011/11/unintended-consequences_18.html' title='Unintended consequences'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-1618572241221552766</id><published>2011-11-12T21:01:00.000Z</published><updated>2011-11-12T21:01:23.190Z</updated><title type='text'>Michael Lewis on Prospect Theory</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://www.3quarksdaily.com/3quarksdaily/2011/11/the-king-of-human-error.html"&gt;Prospect Theory and MoneyBall&lt;/a&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt; "The moment the psychologists uncover some new kink in the human mind, they bestow a strange and forbidding name on it (“the availability heuristic”). In their most cited paper, cryptically titled “Prospect Theory,” they convinced a lot of people that human beings are best understood as being risk-averse when making a decision that offers hope of a gain but risk-seeking when making a decision that will lead to a certain loss. In a stroke they provided a framework to understand all sorts of human behavior that economists, athletic coaches, and other “experts” have trouble explaining: why people who play the lottery also buy insurance; why people are less likely to sell their houses and their stock portfolios in falling markets; why, most sensationally, professional golfers become better putters when they’re trying to save par (avoid losing a stroke) than when they’re trying to make a birdie (and gain a stroke)"&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a style="font-size:13px" href="https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/pengoopmcjnbflcjbmoeodbmoflcgjlk"&gt;'via Blog this'&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;a style="font-size:13px" href="https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/pengoopmcjnbflcjbmoeodbmoflcgjlk"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-1618572241221552766?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/1618572241221552766/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=1618572241221552766' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/1618572241221552766'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/1618572241221552766'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2011/11/michael-lewis-on-prospect-theory.html' title='Michael Lewis on Prospect Theory'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-4662990505296459448</id><published>2011-11-12T20:00:00.000Z</published><updated>2011-11-12T20:00:55.136Z</updated><title type='text'>Unintended consequences</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://www.google.com/reader/view/"&gt;U&lt;/a&gt;nintended consequences: "In the UK, the “Merton Rule” – it originated in the Borough of Merton and has been widely emulated – demands that substantial new developments include the capacity to generate 10 per cent of the building’s energy needs through renewable sources, on site.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Alas, such a rule is hopelessly slack for an out-of-town supermarket – an environmental disaster because of all the driving it encourages, yet with plenty of real estate for solar panels. Meanwhile it is too challenging for a city-centre skyscraper, which is naturally a low-energy building because of its compactness and proximity to public transport."&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a style="font-size:13px" href="https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/pengoopmcjnbflcjbmoeodbmoflcgjlk"&gt;'via Blog this'&lt;/a&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-4662990505296459448?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='related' href='http://www.google.com/reader/view/' title='Unintended consequences'/><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/4662990505296459448/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=4662990505296459448' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/4662990505296459448'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/4662990505296459448'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2011/11/unintended-consequences.html' title='Unintended consequences'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-5613778162166884183</id><published>2011-09-26T19:07:00.000+01:00</published><updated>2011-09-26T19:07:58.065+01:00</updated><title type='text'>The evolution of overconfidence</title><content type='html'>&lt;div&gt;A paper in &lt;i&gt;Nature &lt;/i&gt;makes the case for the positive aspect of over-confidence:  it encourages action and decisive response; it is generally successful or adaptive; when it goes wrong, it goes very wrong.  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v477/n7364/full/nature10384.html"&gt;The evolution of overconfidence : Nature : Nature Publishing Group&lt;/a&gt;:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;This would be consistent with the behaviour that is mirrored in financial markets.  The carry trade is such a confident trait.  There is the belief that the exit can be achieved before the shock.  This is generally successful, certainly more successful than the alternative strategy that would hold back and worry about the risk of a funding currency appreciation.  Those who embark on the strategy make years of gains.  Those who stay on the sidelines, lose out.  When the hit happens, it is a shock that is explained away by specific circumstances.  The over-confident are not blamed and the cautious and not proved 'right' in most cases.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-5613778162166884183?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/5613778162166884183/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=5613778162166884183' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/5613778162166884183'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/5613778162166884183'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2011/09/evolution-of-overconfidence.html' title='The evolution of overconfidence'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-2157931572377060409</id><published>2011-09-13T10:40:00.000+01:00</published><updated>2011-09-13T10:40:14.609+01:00</updated><title type='text'>The price of protection - FT.com</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/02106668-d96d-11e0-b52f-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1Xm2OX9CW"&gt;The price of protection - FT.com&lt;/a&gt;: "However, most banks expect the biggest impact to be felt by corporate customers, particularly mid-sized companies that rely heavily on bank debt. Analysts believe these businesses will sit outside the ringfence, alongside the investment bank activities – the part most at risk of a sharp rise in wholesale funding costs. Creditors generally give higher ratings to banks with retail and investment banking under one roof as they believe they are more stable. Remove that benefit and ratings are likely to fall, making it harder and more expensive to access funds."&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a style="font-size:13px" href="https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/pengoopmcjnbflcjbmoeodbmoflcgjlk"&gt;'via Blog this'&lt;/a&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-2157931572377060409?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/2157931572377060409/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=2157931572377060409' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/2157931572377060409'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/2157931572377060409'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2011/09/price-of-protection-ftcom.html' title='The price of protection - FT.com'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-6098031171880171802</id><published>2011-09-07T08:16:00.000+01:00</published><updated>2011-09-07T08:16:20.275+01:00</updated><title type='text'>The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, by Milton Friedman</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://www.colorado.edu/studentgroups/libertarians/issues/friedman-soc-resp-business.html"&gt;The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, by Milton Friedman&lt;/a&gt;: "The New York Times Magazine, September 13, 1970. Copyright @ 1970 by The New York Times Company.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;When I hear businessmen speak eloquently about the "social responsibilities of business in a free-enterprise system," I am reminded of the wonderful line about the Frenchman who discovered at the age of 70 that he had been speaking prose all his life. The businessmen believe that they are defending free en­terprise when they declaim that business is not concerned "merely" with profit but also with promoting desirable "social" ends; that business has a "social conscience" and takes seriously its responsibilities for providing em­ployment, eliminating discrimination, avoid­ing pollution and whatever else may be the catchwords of the contemporary crop of re­formers. In fact they are–or would be if they or anyone else took them seriously–preach­ing pure and unadulterated socialism. Busi­nessmen who talk this way are unwitting pup­pets of the intellectual forces that have been undermining the basis of a free society these past decades."&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a style="font-size:13px" href="https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/pengoopmcjnbflcjbmoeodbmoflcgjlk"&gt;'via Blog this'&lt;/a&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-6098031171880171802?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/6098031171880171802/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=6098031171880171802' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/6098031171880171802'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/6098031171880171802'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2011/09/social-responsibility-of-business-is-to.html' title='The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, by Milton Friedman'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-6098015786378704976</id><published>2011-08-20T13:01:00.000+01:00</published><updated>2011-08-20T13:01:41.691+01:00</updated><title type='text'>Technology Can't Save Us From Math Mishaps - WSJ.com</title><content type='html'>&lt;div&gt;Nice&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903596904576518251523632110.html"&gt;Technology Can't Save Us From Math Mishaps - WSJ.com&lt;/a&gt;: Mr. Clarke, the economist, suggests that we go easy on statisticians. "Everyone makes spreadsheet mistakes," he says. He repeats advice he received from his best man at his wedding: "The best way to remember your wedding anniversary is to forget it once."&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-6098015786378704976?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/6098015786378704976/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=6098015786378704976' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/6098015786378704976'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/6098015786378704976'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2011/08/technology-cant-save-us-from-math.html' title='Technology Can&apos;t Save Us From Math Mishaps - WSJ.com'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-1703092379952888090</id><published>2011-07-26T06:53:00.000+01:00</published><updated>2011-07-26T06:53:56.591+01:00</updated><title type='text'>Profits from ETF</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d9c49d98-b44e-11e0-9eb8-00144feabdc0.html?ftcamp=rss#axzz1TBXnIszW"&gt;FT.com&lt;/a&gt;: "Why are ETFs so profitable when they appear to be so cheap? Annual management fees have been driven down by price wars, which have been particularly fierce in the US. Synthetic ETFs obviously offer scope for profitable derivative trading and collateral management, but the opportunity to extract revenue is less obvious with physical ETFs, being mainly confined to securities lending. Perhaps running an ETF business is at least in part a means of running a securities lending operation, in which case providers should reveal what proportion of stocks in a portfolio are lent, as the associated counterparty risks are material to investors."&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-1703092379952888090?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/1703092379952888090/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=1703092379952888090' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/1703092379952888090'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/1703092379952888090'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2011/07/profits-from-etf.html' title='Profits from ETF'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-1812663953515482879</id><published>2011-07-06T10:44:00.000+01:00</published><updated>2011-07-06T10:44:50.636+01:00</updated><title type='text'>2011 World’s Most Ethical Companies | Ethisphere™ Institute</title><content type='html'>&lt;div&gt;Useful for the selection of 'ethical companies'.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;a href="http://ethisphere.com/wme2011/"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;a href="http://ethisphere.com/wme2011/"&gt;2011 World’s Most Ethical Companies | Ethisphere™ Institute&lt;/a&gt;: "The World’s Most Ethical Companies designation recognizes companies that truly go beyond making statements about doing business “ethically” and translate those words into action. WME honorees demonstrate real and sustained ethical leadership within their industries, putting into real business practice the Institute’s credo of “Good. Smart. Business. Profit.”"&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-1812663953515482879?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/1812663953515482879/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=1812663953515482879' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/1812663953515482879'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/1812663953515482879'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2011/07/2011-worlds-most-ethical-companies.html' title='2011 World’s Most Ethical Companies | Ethisphere™ Institute'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-4570957202776449977</id><published>2011-07-04T08:13:00.001+01:00</published><updated>2011-07-04T08:13:32.832+01:00</updated><title type='text'>Bond market liquidity</title><content type='html'>&lt;div&gt;The reduction in bond market liquidity due to the decline in bank risk appetite and increased capital requirement. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d8fffff4-a230-11e0-bb06-00144feabdc0.html?ftcamp=rss#axzz1R1ohFhsB"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d8fffff4-a230-11e0-bb06-00144feabdc0.html?ftcamp=rss#axzz1R1ohFhsB"&gt;Lack of liquidity bad for big bond funds - FT.com&lt;/a&gt;: "In 2007 bond fund managers were able to trade bonds at bid/offer spreads of 0.25 per cent. That widened to 2-3 per cent at the height of the crisis from September 2008 to March 2009. Trading spreads subsequently fell back to 0.4-0.5 per cent but have since crept up again to about 1 per cent on fears of the European sovereign debt crisis. Mr Davidson says: “It’s clear the banks don’t want any credit instruments on their books, especially given everything that’s going on in peripheral Europe.”&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;br /&gt;As a result, he adds, anyone managing a bond fund with assets of £1bn ($1.6bn) or more – with individual holdings of £10m plus – has their hands pretty much tied, “unless they resort to the euro market for greater cash liquidity or the CDS [credit default swap] market for greater active liquidity – but they’d be giving away yield in both cases. It is taking people a long time to trade out of an accumulated position of over £100m in a single, not very liquid bond.”"&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-4570957202776449977?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/4570957202776449977/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=4570957202776449977' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/4570957202776449977'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/4570957202776449977'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2011/07/bond-market-liquidity.html' title='Bond market liquidity'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-4840487212777141478</id><published>2011-07-04T08:08:00.000+01:00</published><updated>2011-07-04T08:08:33.057+01:00</updated><title type='text'>Pension fund exposure</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b9564918-a18d-11e0-baa8-00144feabdc0.html?ftcamp=rss#axzz1R1ohFhsB"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Two interesting aspects of this FT report:  The decline in equity share and the increase in alternative assets.&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b9564918-a18d-11e0-baa8-00144feabdc0.html?ftcamp=rss#axzz1R1ohFhsB"&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;Reductions in equity exposure to continue - FT.com&lt;/a&gt;: "UK pension funds have been gradually reducing their allocation to equities in the past decade from 74 per cent in 2000 to 55 per cent in 2010, according to Towers Watson. The equity exposure of UK funds remains the highest of all the large markets; compared with 49 per cent in the US, 37 per cent in Japan, 33 per cent in the Netherlands and 28 per cent in Switzerland. But a decline in equity allocations is common, with the net overall allocation across the largest pension fund&lt;/blockquote&gt; markets down by 13 per cent in the past five years, as pension funds diversify into alternative asset classes, which now account for 19 per cent of all portfolios."&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-4840487212777141478?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/4840487212777141478/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=4840487212777141478' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/4840487212777141478'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/4840487212777141478'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2011/07/pension-fund-exposure.html' title='Pension fund exposure'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-3229846003638272692</id><published>2011-06-24T20:29:00.000+01:00</published><updated>2011-06-24T20:29:20.500+01:00</updated><title type='text'>Smell like team spirit</title><content type='html'>&lt;div&gt;When it comes to taking most of the profits, the top investment banks do not compare with football clubs.  The money flows to the talent. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/3/40822582-9e8d-11e0-9469-00144feabdc0.html?ftcamp=rss#axzz1Pqf5A23F"&gt;Sports franchises: smell like team spirit - FT.com&lt;/a&gt;:&lt;blockquote&gt; "Ditto Stateside. The headline grabbing $400m Platinum Equity supposedly paid for the Detroit Pistons this month is equivalent in size to Stein Mart, 468th in the S&amp;amp;P 600 small cap index. (And the retailer makes 10 times the revenues.) Sports profitability is worse. Why? Wages. Incredibly, the market cap of Juventus FC is only 30 times the annual salary of its best paid player. Goldman Sachs’s market cap is 5,000 times its boss’s last pay packet."&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-3229846003638272692?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/3229846003638272692/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=3229846003638272692' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/3229846003638272692'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/3229846003638272692'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2011/06/smell-like-team-spirit.html' title='Smell like team spirit'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-3636187138547389607</id><published>2011-06-19T20:51:00.000+01:00</published><updated>2011-06-19T20:51:10.485+01:00</updated><title type='text'>Pencil full of  lead</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/scotland/music/rockness/2011/sunday.shtml?mediaset1=1#mediaset1"&gt;BBC - Scotland - Sunday at RockNess 2011&lt;/a&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;object width="640" height="472"&gt;&lt;param name="movie" value="http://www.bbc.co.uk/emp/external/player.swf"&gt;&lt;param name="allowFullScreen" value="true"&gt;&lt;param name="allowScriptAccess" value="always"&gt;&lt;param name="FlashVars" value="config=http%3A%2F%2Fwww%2Ebbc%2Eco%2Euk%2Fscotland%2Fsitewide%2Fmediaset%2F3%2E0%2E3%2Fxml%2Fconf%2Exml&amp;amp;playlist=http%3A%2F%2Fwww%2Ebbc%2Eco%2Euk%2Fscotland%2Fmusic%2Frockness%2F2011%2Fmedia%2Fpaolo%5Fpencil%2Exml&amp;amp;config_settings_suppressRelatedLinks=true&amp;amp;config_settings_skin=black&amp;amp;config_settings_language=en&amp;amp;config_settings_showFooter=true&amp;amp;"&gt;&lt;embed src="http://www.bbc.co.uk/emp/external/player.swf" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" allowfullscreen="true" allowscriptaccess="always" width="640" height="472" flashvars="config=http%3A%2F%2Fwww%2Ebbc%2Eco%2Euk%2Fscotland%2Fsitewide%2Fmediaset%2F3%2E0%2E3%2Fxml%2Fconf%2Exml&amp;amp;playlist=http%3A%2F%2Fwww%2Ebbc%2Eco%2Euk%2Fscotland%2Fmusic%2Frockness%2F2011%2Fmedia%2Fpaolo%5Fpencil%2Exml&amp;amp;config_settings_suppressRelatedLinks=true&amp;amp;config_settings_skin=black&amp;amp;config_settings_language=en&amp;amp;config_settings_showFooter=true&amp;amp;"&gt;&lt;/embed&gt;&lt;/object&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-3636187138547389607?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/3636187138547389607/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=3636187138547389607' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/3636187138547389607'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/3636187138547389607'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2011/06/pencil-full-of-lead.html' title='Pencil full of  lead'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-6626748708093666783</id><published>2011-06-19T08:18:00.000+01:00</published><updated>2011-06-19T08:18:22.678+01:00</updated><title type='text'>Beware the tottering Greek domino</title><content type='html'>&lt;div&gt;Good overview of market sentiment and its measurement.  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7ee40b58-985f-11e0-94d7-00144feab49a.html?ftcamp=rss#axzz1PhgmFkQc"&gt;FT.com / Markets - Beware the tottering Greek domino&lt;/a&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;FT video. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-6626748708093666783?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/6626748708093666783/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=6626748708093666783' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/6626748708093666783'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/6626748708093666783'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2011/06/beware-tottering-greek-domino.html' title='Beware the tottering Greek domino'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-7072477516441547504</id><published>2011-06-08T09:26:00.000+01:00</published><updated>2011-06-08T09:26:06.515+01:00</updated><title type='text'>How I Failed, Failed, and Finally Succeeded at Learning How to Code - James Somers - Technology - The Atlantic</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/06/how-i-failed-failed-and-finally-succeeded-at-learning-how-to-code/239855/1/"&gt;How I Failed, Failed, and Finally Succeeded at Learning How to Code - James Somers - Technology - The Atlantic&lt;/a&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-7072477516441547504?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/7072477516441547504/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=7072477516441547504' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/7072477516441547504'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/7072477516441547504'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2011/06/how-i-failed-failed-and-finally.html' title='How I Failed, Failed, and Finally Succeeded at Learning How to Code - James Somers - Technology - The Atlantic'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-2430936871920312689</id><published>2011-04-24T20:05:00.000+01:00</published><updated>2011-04-24T20:05:22.628+01:00</updated><title type='text'>‘National mania’ blamed for Irish crisis</title><content type='html'>The &lt;a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d37339aa-6b46-11e0-9be1-00144feab49a.html?ftcamp=rss#axzz1KT46vvjF"&gt;FT.com &lt;/a&gt;on the report about Irish banks.  The national speculation seems to be a feature of all such financial crises. It is obvious in retrospect.  At the time, everyone is part of it and after none will take responsibility. &lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;  "Mr Nyberg said the attendant risks went undetected or were seriously misjudged by regulatory authorities “whose actions and warnings were modest and insufficient”.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;A “happy go lucky” attitude prevailed during the period, including among the bondholders that lent to Irish banks.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;“When it all ended, suddenly and inexplicably, participants had difficulty accepting their appropriate share of the blame for something in which so many others were also involved and that seemed reasonable at the time,” the report states"&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-2430936871920312689?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/2430936871920312689/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=2430936871920312689' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/2430936871920312689'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/2430936871920312689'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2011/04/national-mania-blamed-for-irish-crisis.html' title='‘National mania’ blamed for Irish crisis'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-355217905649895875</id><published>2011-04-19T10:49:00.000+01:00</published><updated>2011-04-19T10:49:38.981+01:00</updated><title type='text'>Economist's View: Empirical and Historical Validation of Macroeconomic Models</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2011/04/empirical-and-historical-validation-of-macroeconomic-models.html?utm_source=feedburner&amp;amp;utm_medium=feed&amp;amp;utm_campaign=Feed%3A+EconomistsView+%28Economist%27s+View+%28EconomistsView%29%29"&gt;Economist's View &lt;/a&gt;looks at the failure of the Bernanke type economic accelerator model to explain much of the deviation in output.  However, this is rather the same as the failure of the short period of housing data to show the possibility of a simultaneous fall in house prices across the country. &lt;blockquote&gt;"That was a mistake, but what is the lesson? One is that we should not necessarily ignore something just because it cannot be found in the data. Much of the empirical work prior to the crisis involved data from the early 1980s to the present (due to an assumption of structural change around that time), sometimes the data goes back to 1959 (when standard series on money end), and occasionally empirical work will use data starting in 1947. So important, infrequent events like the great Depression are rarely even in the data we use to test our models. Things that help to explain this episode may not seem important in limited data sets, but we ignore these possibilities at our own peril."&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-355217905649895875?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/355217905649895875/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=355217905649895875' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/355217905649895875'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/355217905649895875'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2011/04/economists-view-empirical-and.html' title='Economist&apos;s View: Empirical and Historical Validation of Macroeconomic Models'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-1972900946719388094</id><published>2011-04-11T14:09:00.000+01:00</published><updated>2011-04-11T14:09:03.234+01:00</updated><title type='text'>Spanish rates and the ECB</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/dc2955ea-63ab-11e0-bd7f-00144feab49a.html?ftcamp=rss#axzz1J9aCbqN5"&gt;FT.com / &lt;/a&gt; "Almost all Spanish mortgages are based on the one-year Euribor money market rate, which is now close to 2 per cent, and rising"&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-1972900946719388094?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/1972900946719388094/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=1972900946719388094' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/1972900946719388094'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/1972900946719388094'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2011/04/spanish-rates-and-ecb.html' title='Spanish rates and the ECB'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-8734464741909268003</id><published>2011-04-09T06:53:00.000+01:00</published><updated>2011-04-09T06:53:13.927+01:00</updated><title type='text'>What will people do for money?</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://www.physorg.com/news/2011-04-people-money.html"&gt;What will people do for money?&lt;/a&gt;: "In the hypothetical scenario, 64 percent of participants said they would never administer a shock to someone else for money. However, in the real world that number changed, and in a big way. When faced with real money, 96 percent chose to shock the person in the other room for money."&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-8734464741909268003?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/8734464741909268003/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=8734464741909268003' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/8734464741909268003'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/8734464741909268003'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2011/04/what-will-people-do-for-money.html' title='What will people do for money?'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-3173892385259902014</id><published>2011-04-05T06:15:00.000+01:00</published><updated>2011-04-05T06:15:36.630+01:00</updated><title type='text'>Fixed income hedge funds</title><content type='html'>The FT looks at &lt;a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9dbaf036-5c9c-11e0-ab7c-00144feab49a.html?ftcamp=rss#axzz1IWvw3e5Y"&gt;fixed income&lt;/a&gt; and some of the key players and strategies in the market: &lt;blockquote&gt;"The resources and infrastructure required means that yield curve hedge funds tend to exist inside banks and the largest asset management firms. In Europe, well-known credit exponents include Trafalgar Asset Managers and BlueBay Asset Management, while yield curve funds include Brevan Howard, Moore Capital, Comac Capital and Prologue Capital."&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-3173892385259902014?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/3173892385259902014/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=3173892385259902014' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/3173892385259902014'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/3173892385259902014'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2011/04/fixed-income-hedge-funds.html' title='Fixed income hedge funds'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-6808120973996399517</id><published>2011-03-23T14:27:00.000Z</published><updated>2011-03-23T14:27:46.682Z</updated><title type='text'>ESM and seniority</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/47af770e-54bb-11e0-b1ed-00144feab49a.html?ftcamp=rss#axzz1HQpu268M"&gt;FT.com / Capital Markets - Eurozone bonds face boycott by investors&lt;/a&gt;: "Standard &amp;amp; Poor’s, the US credit ratings agency, warned earlier this month that any country borrowing from the ESM could face further ratings downgrades because of the seniority issue."&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-6808120973996399517?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='related' href='http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/47af770e-54bb-11e0-b1ed-00144feab49a.html?ftcamp=rss#axzz1HQpu268M' title='ESM and seniority'/><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/6808120973996399517/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=6808120973996399517' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/6808120973996399517'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/6808120973996399517'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2011/03/esm-and-seniority.html' title='ESM and seniority'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-1428459489836463372</id><published>2011-01-11T08:06:00.001Z</published><updated>2011-01-11T08:07:12.349Z</updated><title type='text'>Global credit gaUge</title><content type='html'>The &lt;a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c5a52f4a-1d1c-11e0-b597-00144feab49a.html?ftcamp=rss#axzz1Ac21Tuyh"&gt;FT.com&lt;/a&gt; reports on international measures to increase required capital ratios if credit growth breaches a threashold. &lt;blockquote&gt;"The agreement drew strong support from around the world despite predictions that regulators would be unable to come up with a common definition for bubbles. The deal uses the ratio of credit-to-GDP as its basic measure. But regulators can use other metrics, provided they make their reasoning public"&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-1428459489836463372?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/1428459489836463372/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=1428459489836463372' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/1428459489836463372'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/1428459489836463372'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2011/01/global-credit-guage.html' title='Global credit gaUge'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-3799194557194771393</id><published>2010-12-23T08:45:00.000Z</published><updated>2010-12-23T08:45:18.529Z</updated><title type='text'>Merrill and the CDOs</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://www.propublica.org/article/the-subsidy-how-merrill-lynch-traders-helped-blow-up-their-own-firm"&gt;How Merrill Lynch Traders Helped Blow Up Their Own Firm - ProPublica&lt;/a&gt;: "By the middle of 2006, the Merrill traders who bought mortgage securities were often clashing with the powerful division, run by Harin De Silva and Ken Margolis, which created and sold the CDOs. At least three traders began to refuse to buy CDO pieces created by De Silva and Margolis' division, according to several former Merrill employees. (De Silva and Margolis didn't respond to requests for comment.)"&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-3799194557194771393?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/3799194557194771393/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=3799194557194771393' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/3799194557194771393'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/3799194557194771393'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/12/merrill-and-cdos.html' title='Merrill and the CDOs'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-5767379193491622011</id><published>2010-12-13T10:28:00.000Z</published><updated>2010-12-13T10:28:35.738Z</updated><title type='text'>John Maynard Keynes - A great investor</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://can-turtles-fly.blogspot.com/2010/12/john-maynard-keynes-great-investor.html?"&gt;John Maynard Keynes - A great investor&lt;/a&gt;: &lt;blockquote&gt;"John Maynard Keynes started off as a currency trader, moving to commodities a bit later on. He attempted to invest based on macroeconomic predictions—keep in mind that he was an economist—and it didn't exactly work out in the short run. I didn't quote the rest of the article but Keynes appears to have broke even later on but this was definitely a painful start."&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-5767379193491622011?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='related' href='http://can-turtles-fly.blogspot.com/2010/12/john-maynard-keynes-great-investor.html?' title='John Maynard Keynes - A great investor'/><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/5767379193491622011/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=5767379193491622011' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/5767379193491622011'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/5767379193491622011'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/12/john-maynard-keynes-great-investor.html' title='John Maynard Keynes - A great investor'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-8276756844281482971</id><published>2010-12-13T06:03:00.000Z</published><updated>2010-12-13T06:03:49.686Z</updated><title type='text'>Transaction banking</title><content type='html'>The FT looks at &lt;a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/00d2f010-0617-11e0-976b-00144feabdc0.html?ftcamp=rss#axzz17y7sEKFt"&gt;transaction banking&lt;/a&gt;: &lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;"Few universal banks split out their transaction banking performance. But Deutsche Bank, for example, recorded transaction banking pre-tax profits of €1.1bn in 2008, up 17 per cent and equivalent to an ROE of 108 per cent. Though the number slipped back – to €776m – in 2009, that relatively stable performance contrasts with the investment banking result, which was €7.4bn in the red in 2008, thanks to the toxic asset fall-out from the financial crisis, and then €4.3bn in the black again last year."&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-8276756844281482971?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/8276756844281482971/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=8276756844281482971' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/8276756844281482971'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/8276756844281482971'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/12/transaction-banking.html' title='Transaction banking'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-8054739122444023238</id><published>2010-11-23T21:01:00.000Z</published><updated>2010-11-23T21:01:15.827Z</updated><title type='text'>UK Irish exposure</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/3/18e8966a-f716-11df-8feb-00144feab49a.html?ftcamp=rss#axzz168ozLP7M"&gt;Ireland: a danger zone for banks&lt;/a&gt;:&lt;blockquote&gt; "Settlements estimates that UK lenders account for almost 30 per cent of European banks’ total $509bn exposure to Ireland. RBS and Lloyds, both partially state-owned, have taken the most Irish pain, falling by about 8 and 9 per cent respectively over the past week before regaining some ground on Tuesday"&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-8054739122444023238?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/8054739122444023238/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=8054739122444023238' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/8054739122444023238'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/8054739122444023238'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/11/uk-irish-exposure.html' title='UK Irish exposure'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-458405431416975397</id><published>2010-11-13T07:02:00.000Z</published><updated>2010-11-13T07:02:08.520Z</updated><title type='text'>Negative basis in Ireland</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2010/11/12/403291/touching-negative-basis-in-ireland/"&gt;FT Alphaville&lt;/a&gt; looks at the movement of Irish bonds vs CDS. In this case the bond market is leading the CDS as selling of bonds (to raise, or prevent the need to post, collateral at LCH) has been the main factor behind the move.  Usually, it is the more liquid CDS that makes the move. &lt;blockquote&gt;"Ireland joined Greece this week in the negative basis club. That is, the five-year asset swap spread for Ireland outpaced movement in equivalent credit default swaps. So (in basic terms) spreads in the CDS market were trading lower than in the cash market for Ireland."&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-458405431416975397?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/458405431416975397/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=458405431416975397' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/458405431416975397'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/458405431416975397'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/11/negative-basis-in-ireland.html' title='Negative basis in Ireland'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-4488403430252463925</id><published>2010-11-12T07:01:00.000Z</published><updated>2010-11-12T07:01:30.517Z</updated><title type='text'>German banks and Basel 2</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a79642ce-edc3-11df-9612-00144feab49a.html?ftcamp=rss#axzz1536HwhCN"&gt;FT.com &lt;/a&gt; "It is also a somewhat disturbing paradox that such a successful manufacturing economy remains reliant on such a fragile banking sector. Indeed, of the 44 European banks that have had recourse to state support in the latest crisis, by far the biggest number have been based in Germany, with 13 banks, followed by the UK and Belgium with five cases each"&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-4488403430252463925?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='related' href='http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a79642ce-edc3-11df-9612-00144feab49a.html?ftcamp=rss#axzz1536HwhCN' title='German banks and Basel 2'/><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/4488403430252463925/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=4488403430252463925' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/4488403430252463925'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/4488403430252463925'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/11/german-banks-and-basel-2.html' title='German banks and Basel 2'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-5102461893217549399</id><published>2010-10-31T08:34:00.000Z</published><updated>2010-10-31T08:34:10.469Z</updated><title type='text'>Allocation of education</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://www.lrb.co.uk/v32/n21/stefan-collini/brownes-gamble"&gt;Stefan Collini&lt;/a&gt; discusses education reform.  The bottom line, he says, is &lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.lrb.co.uk/v32/n21/stefan-collini/brownes-gamble"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt; "We can have the money for a national system of higher education distributed either in accordance with the tastes of 18-year-olds or in accordance with the tastes of a group of older people in London: there’s no other way to do it."&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;but does not propose an alternative.   How else can education be allocated? &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-5102461893217549399?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='related' href='http://www.lrb.co.uk/v32/n21/stefan-collini/brownes-gamble' title='Allocation of education'/><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/5102461893217549399/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=5102461893217549399' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/5102461893217549399'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/5102461893217549399'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/10/allocation-of-education.html' title='Allocation of education'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-563937572313691432</id><published>2010-10-27T07:07:00.000+01:00</published><updated>2010-10-27T07:07:17.212+01:00</updated><title type='text'>Private equity</title><content type='html'>Malcolm Gladwell looks at private equity and the &lt;a href="http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/books/2010/11/01/101101crbo_books_gladwell?currentPage=all"&gt;the rescue of General Motors : The New Yorker&lt;/a&gt;: &lt;blockquote&gt;"That seems about right: car companies stand or fall, ultimately, on the strength of their product, and teaching a giant company how to build a quality car again is something that can’t be done on the private-equity timetable. The problem is that no private-equity manager wants to be thought of as a mere financial engineer."&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-563937572313691432?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='related' href='http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/books/2010/11/01/101101crbo_books_gladwell?currentPage=all' title='Private equity'/><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/563937572313691432/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=563937572313691432' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/563937572313691432'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/563937572313691432'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/10/private-equity.html' title='Private equity'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-8548980060521038693</id><published>2010-10-26T19:18:00.000+01:00</published><updated>2010-10-26T19:18:50.280+01:00</updated><title type='text'>You can't buck the market</title><content type='html'>The &lt;a href="http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2010/10/26/383476/real-appreciation/"&gt;FT Alphaville&lt;/a&gt; looks at the real appreciation of the Chinese currency from the increase in inflation rather than the nominal appreciation.  This is a forgotten channel and one that is exacerbated by the intervention to hold the rate stable.   There may be ways of sterilising in a controlled economy but it is likely that the underlying pressure will emerge in some way. &lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt; "We’ll quickly note that the Fed’s expected QE2 measures will, if successful in bringing about inflationary pressures, further add to the pressure on China to appreciate."&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;Alphavile argues that these inflationary pressures will increase the pressure on the Chinese authorities. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-8548980060521038693?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/8548980060521038693/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=8548980060521038693' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/8548980060521038693'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/8548980060521038693'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/10/you-cant-buck-market.html' title='You can&apos;t buck the market'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-4550789356730136874</id><published>2010-10-23T06:18:00.000+01:00</published><updated>2010-10-23T06:18:43.374+01:00</updated><title type='text'>Marginal Revolution: Classical economics reading list</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://www.marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2010/10/classical-economist-reading-list.html"&gt;Marginal Revolution: Classical economics reading list&lt;/a&gt;: &lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;1) Smith&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;2) Hume&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;3) Ricardo&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;4) Early marginalists&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;5) Malthus&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;6) Edinburgh Review&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;7) Mill&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;8) Marx&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-4550789356730136874?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/4550789356730136874/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=4550789356730136874' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/4550789356730136874'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/4550789356730136874'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/10/marginal-revolution-classical-economics.html' title='Marginal Revolution: Classical economics reading list'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-163927829018517703</id><published>2010-10-23T06:16:00.000+01:00</published><updated>2010-10-23T06:16:10.401+01:00</updated><title type='text'>The Economist: Junk Bonds</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://www.economist.com/research/articlesBySubject/displayStory.cfm?story_id=17306419&amp;amp;amp;subjectID=348885&amp;amp;amp;fsrc=nwl"&gt;Drexel Burnham Lambert's legacy: Stars of the junkyard | The Economist&lt;/a&gt;: "Junk bonds, once despised, are now mainstream. “Milken and Drexel took high-yield bonds from a cottage industry to one of the cornerstones of the financial industry,” says Howard Marks, one of Mr Milken’s early customers and now chairman of Oaktree, a Los Angeles firm that manages around $75 billion in funds, much of it in high-yield bonds and related investments."&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-163927829018517703?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/163927829018517703/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=163927829018517703' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/163927829018517703'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/163927829018517703'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/10/economist-junk-bonds.html' title='The Economist: Junk Bonds'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-3716587544072519380</id><published>2010-10-11T06:51:00.002+01:00</published><updated>2010-10-11T06:53:11.552+01:00</updated><title type='text'>Before the bank</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://www.pepysdiary.com/archive/1667/10/10/"&gt;Pepy's Diary 10th October 1667&lt;/a&gt;.  Trying to find the gold that he buried at his father's house in the country. &lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Georgia, Times, serif; font-size: 13px; line-height: 23px; "&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;And he being gone, and what company there was, my father and I, with a dark lantern; it being now night, into the garden with my wife, and there went about our great work to dig up my gold. But, Lord! what a tosse I was for some time in, that they could not justly tell where it was; that I begun heartily to sweat, and be angry, that they should not agree better upon the place, and at last to fear that it was gone but by and by poking with a spit, we found it, and then begun with a spudd to lift up the ground. But, good God! to see how sillily they did it, not half a foot under ground, and in the sight of the world from a hundred places, if any body by accident were near hand, and within sight of a neighbour’s window, and their hearing also, being close by: only my father says that he saw them all gone to church before he begun the work, when he laid the money, but that do not excuse it to me. But I was out of my wits almost, and the more from that, upon my lifting up the earth with the spudd, I did discern that I had scattered the pieces of gold round about the ground among the grass and loose earth; and taking up the iron head-pieces wherein they were put, I perceive the earth was got among the gold, and wet, so that the bags were all rotten, and all the notes, that I could not tell what in the world to say to it, not knowing how to judge what was wanting, or what had been lost by &lt;a href="http://www.pepysdiary.com/p/9465.php" style="color: rgb(106, 33, 9); text-decoration: underline; background-image: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: transparent; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; "&gt;Gibson&lt;/a&gt; in his coming down: which, all put together, did make me mad; and at last was forced to take up the head-pieces, dirt and all, and as many of the scattered pieces as I could with the dirt discern by the candlelight, and carry them up into my brother’s chamber, and there locke them up till I had eat a little supper: and then, all people going to bed, W. Hewer and I did all alone, with several pails of water and basins, at last wash the dirt off of the pieces, and parted the pieces and the dirt, and then begun to tell [them]; and by a note which I had of the value of the whole in my pocket, do find that there was short above a hundred pieces, which did make me mad; and considering that the neighbour’s house was so near that we could not suppose we could speak one to another in the garden at the place where the gold lay — especially my father being deaf — but they must know what we had been doing on, I feared that they might in the night come and gather some pieces and prevent us the next morning; so W. Hewer and I out again about midnight, for it was now grown so late, and there by candlelight did make shift to gather forty-five pieces more. And so in, and to cleanse them: and by this time it was past two in the morning; and so to bed, with my mind pretty quiet to think that I have recovered so many. And then to bed, and I lay in the trundle-bed, the girl being gone to bed to my wife, and there lay in some disquiet all night, telling of the clock till it was daylight.&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-3716587544072519380?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/3716587544072519380/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=3716587544072519380' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/3716587544072519380'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/3716587544072519380'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/10/before-bank.html' title='Before the bank'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-2890276171809439005</id><published>2010-10-05T10:37:00.000+01:00</published><updated>2010-10-05T10:37:45.682+01:00</updated><title type='text'>Internalising</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2010/10/05/360071/the-non-role-of-internalizers-during-the-flash-crash/"&gt;FT Alphaville&lt;/a&gt; discusses the internalising of equity market in large investment banks.  This means that the bank nets the buy and sell orders and sends the balance to the exchange.  &lt;blockquote&gt;"As for the proportion of trading conducted this way? According to the last stats seen by FT Alphaville, something like 31 per cent of all US equity orders were being internalised as of January, 2010."&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-2890276171809439005?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/2890276171809439005/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=2890276171809439005' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/2890276171809439005'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/2890276171809439005'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/10/internalising.html' title='Internalising'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-5248302089750309869</id><published>2010-10-04T07:03:00.002+01:00</published><updated>2010-10-04T07:07:06.581+01:00</updated><title type='text'>Networks and liquidity</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://www.economicprincipals.com/issues/2010.10.03/1183.html?utm_source=feedburner&amp;amp;utm_medium=feed&amp;amp;utm_campaign=Feed:+EconomicPrincipals+(Economic+Principals)"&gt;David Warsh&lt;/a&gt; points us to Paul David and an essay on the "flash crash".   The end to open outcry may have some effects that allow the transmission of shock or 'catastrophe beyond what would previously have been the case.  It is a story of fragmented liquidity and an end to face-to-face dealing.   &lt;div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px; border-collapse: collapse; "&gt;Still, if it’s the crash itself that is of interest, you’ll do better reading the SEC report.  It is the larger dimension of the signal that interests David. He invokes the work of French mathematician René Thom, inventor in the 1970s of a formal mathematics of sudden shifts, of qualitative breaks or &lt;em&gt;discontinuities&lt;/em&gt;, that he called &lt;em&gt;catastrophes&lt;/em&gt;.  “To appreciate that quality it is helpful to start from the mathematical rather than the ordinary language meanings conveyed the term,” David writes.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;blockquote style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px; border-collapse: collapse; "&gt;&lt;p&gt;A commonplace physical illustration of a “catastrophic event” – in this formal sense of the term — may be experienced by letting your finger trace the surface of a draped fabric until it reaches a point where the surface (the “manifold” as mathematicians would speak of the shawl or cloak’s three-dimensional surface) has folded under itself; there gravity will cause your finger’s point of contact to drop precipitously from the surface along which it was traveling smoothly – to land upon the lower level of the drapery beyond the fold. That little passage is the “catastrophe.” In the present context, what is especially relevant about this conceptualization of the “event” experienced by your finger is its generic nature: catastrophes thus conceived are not phenomena belonging to a category delimited by some size dimension of the system in which they occur, or according to the severity of their sequelae; nor are they to be uniquely associated with processes that that operate only in one or another range of temporal velocities (whether slow, or fast). Instead, the catastrophes to which this essay’s title refers are &lt;em&gt;fractal&lt;/em&gt;, possessing the property of self-similarity.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;p style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px; border-collapse: collapse; "&gt;Similar to what? He compares the conditions that led to the May 6 price break to the phenomenon known as “flaming.” One party breaks off a previously civil exchange with hostile abusive comment.  Instead of turning it aside, others sometimes reciprocate.  Anonymity is the key part of the process; isolation seems to remove inhibitions that would brake the process if the exchanges took place face to face.  Silence ensues, or, worse yet, digital versions of what long ago were called “slam books” – compendia of the faults of others, sufficient to fragment the conversation once and for all. (This is the problem with Glen Beck and much of the rest of Fox News.)&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px; border-collapse: collapse; "&gt;Humans evolved to recognize from infancy the effect of their actions on others – facial expressions, body language, tone of voice, he notes.  On the Internet, however, no one knows when they may come across as a flame-throwing tank. It is why humor is so risky on the Web.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px; border-collapse: collapse; "&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px; border-collapse: collapse; "&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px; border-collapse: collapse; "&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-5248302089750309869?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/5248302089750309869/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=5248302089750309869' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/5248302089750309869'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/5248302089750309869'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/10/networks-and-liquidity.html' title='Networks and liquidity'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-4146487781763333656</id><published>2010-10-03T13:24:00.000+01:00</published><updated>2010-10-03T13:24:21.753+01:00</updated><title type='text'>Exchange traded fx products</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/31a6fce8-cd89-11df-9c82-00144feab49a.html?ftcamp=rss"&gt;FT.com&lt;/a&gt; discusses the lack of growth in ETP in the FX space.  However, there is an interesting product from Deutsche Bank that tries to combine three basic strategies.  One case study could try to set the rules for such a product. &lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt; "For investors who do not want to take simple long/short positions, an alternative tactical approach to foreign exchange markets is offered by Deutsche Bank and its db x-trackers currency returns ETF. This combines three strategies widely used by traders in currency markets: carry, momentum and valuation. Like a quantitative hedge fund, it uses a rules-based process to take long and short positions in G10 currencies with regular rebalancing of the components."&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-4146487781763333656?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/4146487781763333656/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=4146487781763333656' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/4146487781763333656'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/4146487781763333656'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/10/exchange-traded-fx-products.html' title='Exchange traded fx products'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-4134930463310386609</id><published>2010-10-02T21:54:00.003+01:00</published><updated>2010-10-02T21:56:13.530+01:00</updated><title type='text'>Market  or command</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/10/04/101004fa_fact_gladwell?currentPage=all"&gt;A comparison of social network&lt;/a&gt; and command as a means of organisation. &lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small; line-height: 15px; "&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;In a new book called “The Dragonfly Effect: Quick, Effective, and Powerful Ways to Use Social Media to Drive Social Change,” the business consultant Andy Smith and the Stanford Business School professor Jennifer Aaker tell the story of Sameer Bhatia, a young Silicon Valley entrepreneur who came down with acute myelogenous leukemia. It’s a perfect illustration of social media’s strengths. Bhatia needed a bone-marrow transplant, but he could not find a match among his relatives and friends. The odds were best with a donor of his ethnicity, and there were few South Asians in the national bone-marrow database. So Bhatia’s business partner sent out an e-mail explaining Bhatia’s plight to more than four hundred of their acquaintances, who forwarded the e-mail to their personal contacts; Facebook pages and YouTube videos were devoted to the Help Sameer campaign. Eventually, nearly twenty-five thousand new people were registered in the bone-marrow database, and Bhatia found a match.&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;The broad theme is that command is necessary for real, serious, important and difficult tasks; social networks are broader, more creative and more trivial. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-4134930463310386609?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/4134930463310386609/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=4134930463310386609' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/4134930463310386609'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/4134930463310386609'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/10/market-or-command.html' title='Market  or command'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-941884913569693407</id><published>2010-09-28T06:40:00.002+01:00</published><updated>2010-09-28T06:40:36.835+01:00</updated><title type='text'>Commodity fund</title><content type='html'>All About Alpha investigates commodity funds.&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; color: rgb(0, 43, 93); line-height: 21px; "&gt;&lt;p style="margin-top: 15px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 15px; margin-left: 0px; padding-top: 0px; padding-right: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; padding-left: 0px; "&gt;Because of the capital costs of holding commodities directly, investing is almost exclusively done using futures (exceptions include commodity producers, consumers, etc.) Commodity indices, ETFs, ETNs and mutual funds manage their portfolios very similarly when using futures contracts. For the most part, they construct the portfolio by purchasing near-dated futures contracts. As the contracts near maturity, they sell the contract at or near the spot price of the commodity and purchase new near-dated contracts and the process repeats itself. The frequency and magnitude of this roll leads to the importance of the yield it generates.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p style="margin-top: 15px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 15px; margin-left: 0px; padding-top: 0px; padding-right: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; padding-left: 0px; "&gt;Unfortunately, investing in commodity futures contracts can be complicated since total returns are comprised of three return components:&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul style="margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px; padding-top: 0px; padding-right: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; padding-left: 0px; "&gt;&lt;li style="margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 5px; margin-left: 42px; padding-top: 0px; padding-right: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; padding-left: 0px; list-style-type: square; list-style-position: initial; list-style-image: initial; "&gt;&lt;strong style="margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px; padding-top: 0px; padding-right: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; padding-left: 0px; "&gt;Collateral Yield:&lt;/strong&gt; Futures contracts require very little collateralization (~10%). The remainder is frequently invested in high-quality, short-term instruments such as a 90-Day T-Bill. The yield from these investments is often very small relative to the total return and is known as the collateral yield.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;ul style="margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px; padding-top: 0px; padding-right: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; padding-left: 0px; "&gt;&lt;li style="margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 5px; margin-left: 42px; padding-top: 0px; padding-right: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; padding-left: 0px; list-style-type: square; list-style-position: initial; list-style-image: initial; "&gt;&lt;strong style="margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px; padding-top: 0px; padding-right: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; padding-left: 0px; "&gt;Spot Price Change/Yield:&lt;/strong&gt; This represents the price change in the underlying commodity contract and is often quoted during a discussion of a commodity’s return. Investors are usually seeking exposure to these returns when choosing to invest in commodities.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;ul style="margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px; padding-top: 0px; padding-right: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; padding-left: 0px; "&gt;&lt;li style="margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 5px; margin-left: 42px; padding-top: 0px; padding-right: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; padding-left: 0px; list-style-type: square; list-style-position: initial; list-style-image: initial; "&gt;&lt;strong style="margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px; padding-top: 0px; padding-right: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; padding-left: 0px; "&gt;Roll Yield:&lt;/strong&gt; This component of return is the focal point of the recent articles and is a little more complicated. Commodity investors (e.g. indices, funds, etc.) tend to buy near-dated contracts (e.g. 1-month from expiration) and sell them just prior to settlement. The revenue generated is immediately used to purchase another near-dated contract to maintain exposure to the commodity. This process continues indefinitely and represents the roll yield (sale price less purchase price). If the subsequent purchase cost is less than the revenue gained from the sale, then the roll yield is positive; if the sale prices is less than the purchase price the roll yield is negative. A positive roll yield is referred to as backwardation while a negative yield is called contango.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-941884913569693407?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/941884913569693407/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=941884913569693407' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/941884913569693407'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/941884913569693407'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/09/commodity-fund.html' title='Commodity fund'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-3666869809075875676</id><published>2010-09-25T05:26:00.003+01:00</published><updated>2010-09-25T05:29:20.828+01:00</updated><title type='text'>Information</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20100924a.htm"&gt;Ben Bernanke&lt;/a&gt; looks at what the financial crisis means for economics.  In the middle of this there is an overview of information and expectations under uncertainty.  &lt;div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px; border-collapse: collapse; "&gt;&lt;p&gt;Most fundamentally, and perhaps most challenging for researchers, the crisis should motivate economists to think further about their modeling of human behavior. Most economic researchers continue to work within the classical paradigm that assumes rational, self-interested behavior and the maximization of "expected utility"--a framework based on a formal description of risky situations and a theory of individual choice that has been very useful through its integration of economics, statistics, and decision theory.&lt;sup&gt;9&lt;/sup&gt; An important assumption of that framework is that, in making decisions under uncertainty, economic agents can assign meaningful probabilities to alternative outcomes. However, during the worst phase of the financial crisis, many economic actors--including investors, employers, and consumers--metaphorically threw up their hands and admitted that, given the extreme and, in some ways, unprecedented nature of the crisis, they did not know what they did not know. Or, as Donald Rumsfeld might have put it, there were too many "unknown unknowns." The profound uncertainty associated with the "unknown unknowns" during the crisis resulted in panicky selling by investors, sharp cuts in payrolls by employers, and significant increases in households' precautionary saving.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The idea that, at certain times, decisionmakers simply cannot assign meaningful probabilities to alternative outcomes--indeed, cannot even think of all the possible outcomes--is known as Knightian uncertainty, after the economist Frank Knight who discussed the idea in the 1920s. Although economists and psychologists have long recognized the challenges such ambiguity presents and have analyzed the distinction between risk aversion and ambiguity aversion, much of this work has been abstract and relatively little progress has been made in describing and predicting the behavior of human beings under circumstances in which their knowledge and experience provide little useful information.&lt;sup&gt;10&lt;/sup&gt; Research in this area could aid our understanding of crises and other extreme situations. I suspect that progress will require careful empirical research with attention to psychological as well as economic factors.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px; border-collapse: collapse; "&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;This can be tied to the modelling of expectations in the UIP model.  There may be a non-linear model that is distributed with a negative skew and kurtosis in regular times and collapses into something binary in a crisis.  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-3666869809075875676?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/3666869809075875676/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=3666869809075875676' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/3666869809075875676'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/3666869809075875676'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/09/information.html' title='Information'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-3982173361214856788</id><published>2010-09-21T06:19:00.003+01:00</published><updated>2010-09-21T06:21:33.845+01:00</updated><title type='text'>Not poisoned but starved</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://seedmagazine.com/content/article/this_is_your_brain_on_food/"&gt;Gary Wenk&lt;/a&gt; speaks about "brain food" and the way that the shared ancestory of ourselves and plants makes components of our food most effective in affecting our bodies and minds.  Amidst this:&lt;div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: georgia, serif; line-height: 22px; "&gt;No, he does not die, because his species and that of the creature on this foreign planet do not share an evolutionary past or a common ancestor. Although they may both be made of proteins formed from amino acids, their independent evolutionary paths should made it highly improbable that they use similar neurotransmitter molecules within their respective brains and bodies. Every spaceman from Flash Gordon to Captain Kirk to Luke Skywalker should feel safe walking around any planet (except their own) with impunity from animal and plant toxins. For this same reason, the intoxicating drinks and powerful medicines that always seem to be popular in these foreign worlds in science fiction movies would also have totally different effects, if any effects at all, on the brains of our plucky spaceman. Eating otherworldly foods might be the most disappointing and distressing experience of all: Even if they were filling and somehow tasted delicious, as products of utterly alien biochemistries they would probably prove devoid of nourishment for our Earthly bodies. Thus, starvation might be the greatest threat to any future explorers of alien biospheres. Unless, perhaps, they’d brought along a large supply of chocolate.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: georgia, serif; line-height: 22px; "&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-3982173361214856788?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/3982173361214856788/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=3982173361214856788' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/3982173361214856788'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/3982173361214856788'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/09/not-poisoned-but-starved.html' title='Not poisoned but starved'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-8285049143407523972</id><published>2010-09-20T12:51:00.002+01:00</published><updated>2010-09-20T13:37:25.346+01:00</updated><title type='text'>Risk</title><content type='html'>Another look at the nature of risk in the coverage of EMH &lt;a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3d0b48ba-c27f-11df-956e-00144feab49a.html?ftcamp=rss"&gt;in the FT&lt;/a&gt;.  &lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;p style="padding-left: 12px; margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 1.3em; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 13px; "&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p style="padding-left: 12px; margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 1.3em; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 13px; "&gt;Second is the pro-cyclical nature of value-at-risk, a measure of the risk of loss. Recent high market volatility is sharpening attention towards risk and the need to measure and manage it. At the same time, rapid financial innovation has increased the ability to monitor and control risks, allowing measures like Var to gain further ground. This would all be good news, if the markets were using the right type of Var for establishing the risk limits.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p style="padding-left: 12px; margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 1.3em; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 13px; "&gt;Generally, when prices move down, Var goes up, eventually triggering the risk limits and thus enlarging the troops of sellers. Symmetrically, the reduction of Var in good times encourages traders and fund managers to pile on risk, increasing their risk exposures when prices are already high and while demand is thriving. This can compound the positive feedback mentioned earlier.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;p style="padding-left: 12px; margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 1.3em; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 13px; "&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p style="padding-left: 12px; margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 1.3em; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 13px; "&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Georgia, serif; font-size: 16px; "&gt;The interesting thing here is the way that a period of low volatility will provide a sample of low volatility and increased risk taking.  Increased volatility leads to less risk taking.  Can we model this?&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p style="padding-left: 12px; margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 1.3em; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 13px; "&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-8285049143407523972?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/8285049143407523972/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=8285049143407523972' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/8285049143407523972'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/8285049143407523972'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/09/risk.html' title='Risk'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-413903576899300589</id><published>2010-09-08T06:17:00.001+01:00</published><updated>2010-09-08T06:18:52.972+01:00</updated><title type='text'>Mobile phone and microfinance</title><content type='html'>Amidst a discussion of mobile phones in Kenya in &lt;a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/sep/07/kenya-mobile-operator-price-war"&gt;the Guardian&lt;/a&gt;, the possibility that microfinance improvements may also be seen. &lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px; border-collapse: collapse; "&gt;Besides enabling millions of people to easily communicate over distance for the first time, the mobile phone has spurred a host of other life-improving innovations, including a money transfer service that allows people to send cash instantly across the country via text message.&lt;/span&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-413903576899300589?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/413903576899300589/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=413903576899300589' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/413903576899300589'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/413903576899300589'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/09/mobile-phone-and-microfinance.html' title='Mobile phone and microfinance'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-990848357482994242</id><published>2010-08-21T06:47:00.001+01:00</published><updated>2010-08-21T06:49:33.955+01:00</updated><title type='text'>Washington Consensus</title><content type='html'>Interesting!  I had never seen this before. &lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.stanford.edu/~johntayl/McKinnon%20Review%202%20_2_.pdf"&gt;From Ronald McKinnon. &lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px; border-collapse: collapse; "&gt;&lt;p&gt;John Williamson (1990) did all a great favor by writing down the rules for what he called “The Washington Consensus” for developing countries to follow to absorb aid efficiently:&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ol&gt;&lt;li&gt;Fiscal policy discipline.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Redirection of public spending from subsidies (“especially in discriminate subsidies” toward broad-based provision of key pro-growth, pro-poor services like primary education, primary health care, and infrastructure;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Tax Reform—broadening the tax base and adopting moderate marginal tax rates:&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Interest rates that are market determined and positive (but moderate) in real terms;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Competitive exchange rates;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Trade liberalization—with particular emphasis on the elimination of quantitative restrictions; any trade protection to be provided by low and relatively uniform tariffs;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Liberalization of inward foreign direct investment;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Privatization of state enterprises;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Deregulation—abolish regulations that impede market entry or restrict competition, except for those justified on safety, environmental and consumer protection grounds, and prudent oversight of financial institutions.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Legal security for property rights.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ol&gt;&lt;p&gt;To provide perspective on these ten rules, the year 1990, when Williamson wrote, is important. It was just after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the complete collapse of confidence in Soviet-style socialism. The rules reflect the hegemonic confidence that most people then had in liberal market-oriented capitalism—think Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. But, 20 years later, should the meteoric rise of socialist China—both in its own remarkable growth in living standards, and in the effectiveness of its foreign “aid” to developing countries, undermine our confidence in Williamson’s Washington Consensus?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-990848357482994242?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/990848357482994242/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=990848357482994242' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/990848357482994242'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/990848357482994242'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/08/washington-consensus.html' title='Washington Consensus'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-1076376366526010777</id><published>2010-08-19T06:26:00.002+01:00</published><updated>2010-08-19T06:30:13.551+01:00</updated><title type='text'>Copyright and competition</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://www.spiegel.de/international/zeitgeist/0,1518,710976,00.html"&gt;De Spiegel&lt;/a&gt; discusses work by Wolfgang Menzel that suggests that an absence of copy right in Germany was responsible for a flourishing of ideas.  In contrast to England, where copyright laws kept monopoly power over ideas and prevented competition, in Germany there was an outpouring of non-fiction publishing.  German publishers reacted to their inability to enforce their rights by using price discrimination to cover the market. &lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: verdana, arial, helvetica, geneva, sans-serif; font-size: 12px; line-height: 18px; "&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: verdana, arial, helvetica, geneva, sans-serif; font-size: 12px; line-height: 18px; "&gt;In Germany during the same period, publishers had plagiarizers -- who could reprint each new publication and sell it cheaply without fear of punishment -- breathing down their necks. Successful publishers were the ones who took a sophisticated approach in reaction to these copycats and devised a form of publication still common today, issuing fancy editions for their wealthy customers and low-priced paperbacks for the masses.&lt;/span&gt; &lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-1076376366526010777?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/1076376366526010777/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=1076376366526010777' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/1076376366526010777'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/1076376366526010777'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/08/copyright-and-competition.html' title='Copyright and competition'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-8359761127647092713</id><published>2010-08-16T15:04:00.003+01:00</published><updated>2010-08-16T15:06:48.594+01:00</updated><title type='text'>European money markets</title><content type='html'>Some interesting comments on the state of the money market in Europe.  It appears that things remain very tight and that collateral is increasingly demanded. &lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span" style="color: rgb(51, 51, 51); line-height: 21px; "&gt;What Comotto emphasises, however, is that while that trend may have begun as far back as the 1990s, the recent European crisis has now nearly &lt;strong&gt;completely vaporised &lt;/strong&gt;what little unsecured interbank lending was left in the market. What’s more, the demand for tri-party transactions — where collateral is managed by a custodian rather than bilaterally — has almost doubled from less than 25 per cent before the Lehman crisis to almost 50 per cent since.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span" style="color: rgb(51, 51, 51); line-height: 21px; "&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span" style="color: rgb(51, 51, 51); line-height: 21px; "&gt;This is from Richard Comotto of the European repo market, quoted in the &lt;a href="http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2010/08/16/315556/euribor-has-been-vaporised/"&gt;FT's Alphaville&lt;/a&gt;.  There is a lot more interesting information on the repo and money markets. //&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-8359761127647092713?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/8359761127647092713/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=8359761127647092713' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/8359761127647092713'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/8359761127647092713'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/08/european-money-markets.html' title='European money markets'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-1489105198170107496</id><published>2010-07-26T17:13:00.004+01:00</published><updated>2010-07-26T17:17:41.270+01:00</updated><title type='text'>Power law and SMEs</title><content type='html'>&lt;span class="Apple-style-span"   style="  ;font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:13px;"&gt;More evidence of a power law. &lt;blockquote&gt; The National Endowment for Science, Technology and the Arts, an independent trade body, calculates that just 6 per cent of the highest growth businesses generated 54 per cent of new jobs over the last decade.&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span"   style="  ;font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:13px;"&gt;This is important because it means that it is a few high quality SME creations that generate all the social benefit as well as the profit. More from the &lt;a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/3/28d7c0c4-9892-11df-a0b7-00144feab49a.html?ftcamp=rss"&gt;Financial Times Lex column&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-1489105198170107496?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/1489105198170107496/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=1489105198170107496' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/1489105198170107496'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/1489105198170107496'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/07/more-evidence-of-power-law.html' title='Power law and SMEs'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-4133266866682238705</id><published>2010-07-03T07:41:00.002+01:00</published><updated>2010-07-03T07:45:09.803+01:00</updated><title type='text'>Changes in microsctures</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://rajivsethi.blogspot.com/2010/07/market-microstructure-and-capital.html"&gt;Raijiv Sethi&lt;/a&gt; raises the idea that increased focus on algorithmic trading is removing the support for smaller size capitalisation and reducing the number of public limited companies.  &lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Trebuchet, 'Trebuchet MS', Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px; color: rgb(51, 51, 51); line-height: 16px; "&gt;&lt;blockquote style="margin-top: 1em; margin-right: 20px; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 20px; "&gt;In addition, stock market structure today is geared for large‐capitalization stocks with typically symmetrical order books but disastrous for the vast majority of small‐capitalization stocks with asymmetrical order books (where there is not naturally an offsetting buy order to match against a sell order and vice versa)... The “Flash Crash” was an example of where even normally liquid securities went to a state of “asymmetry” and price discovery broke down...&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;blockquote style="margin-top: 1em; margin-right: 20px; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 20px; "&gt;[Until] all trades, quotes and other messages in all interrelated markets are tagged and traceable to the trading venue, broker and ultimate investor, and disclosed to the market, markets will not be perceived as fair... With full tagging, tracking and reporting and the application of posttrade analysis and test bed techniques such as Agent‐Based Models, regulators and market participants will... once and for all be in a position to judge the impact of other participants and to regulate and plan accordingly...&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-4133266866682238705?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/4133266866682238705/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=4133266866682238705' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/4133266866682238705'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/4133266866682238705'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/07/changes-in-microsctures.html' title='Changes in microsctures'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-7767104351685878695</id><published>2010-07-03T07:22:00.000+01:00</published><updated>2010-07-03T07:23:12.241+01:00</updated><title type='text'>Liquidity Preference</title><content type='html'>Keynes:&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px; border-collapse: collapse; "&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;Because... our desire to hold Money as a store of wealth is a barometer of the degree of our distrust of our own calculations and conventions concerning the future.... The significance of this characteristic of money has usually been overlooked; and in so far as it has been noticed, the essential nature of the phenomenon has been misdescribed. For what has attracted attention has been the quantity of money which has been hoarded... supposed to have a direct proportionate effect on the price level through affecting the velocity of circulation. But the quantity of hoards can only be altered either if the total quantity of money is changed or if the quantity of current money income (I speak broadly) is changed; whereas fluctuations in the degree of confidence are capable of... modifying... the premium which has to be offered to induce people not to hoard. And changes in... liquidity preference... affect, not [consumer] prices, but the rate of interest.&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-7767104351685878695?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/7767104351685878695/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=7767104351685878695' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/7767104351685878695'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/7767104351685878695'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/07/liquidity-preference.html' title='Liquidity Preference'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-6152489837317930675</id><published>2010-06-21T08:38:00.002+01:00</published><updated>2010-06-21T08:42:52.074+01:00</updated><title type='text'>Keynes and uncertainty</title><content type='html'>Keynes in the 1937 Journal of Economics take another look at uncertainty.  &lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px; border-collapse: collapse; "&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;By ‘uncertain’ knowledge, let me explain, I do not mean merely to distinguish what is known for certain from what is only probable. The game of roulette is not subject, in this sense, to uncertainty; nor is the prospect of a Victory bond being drawn. Or, again, the expectation of life is only slightly uncertain.... The sense in which I am using the term is that in which the prospect of an European war is uncertain, or the price of copper and the rate of interest twenty years hence, or the obsolescence of a new invention, or the position of private wealth-owners in the social system in 1970. About these matters their is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability whatever. We simply do not know. Nevertheless, the necessity for action and for decision compels us as practical men to do our best to overlook this awkward fact and to behave exactly as we should if we had behind us a good Benthamite calculation.... How do we manage?... (1) We assume that the present is a much more serviceable guide to the future than a candid examination of past experience would show it.... (2) We assume that the existing state of opinion as expressed in prices and the character of existing output is based on a correct summing up of future prospects.... (3) Knowing that our individual judgment is worthless, we endeavour to fall back on the judgment of the rest of the world which is perhaps better informed....&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;The key here seems to be a vague and embryonic outline of some of the ideas of behavioural finance.  How do we deal with uncertainty when there is no basis to make an estimate of probabilities?  What short-cuts can the mind use to deal with these issues?  One of the things that Keynes suggests here and the &lt;i&gt;The General Theory&lt;/i&gt; is the idea that we assume that things will be rather similar to how they have been in the past.  This is probably a reasonable starting point.  It is &lt;i&gt;conservatism.  &lt;/i&gt;Another thing that Keynes suggests is that we look to the opinion of others. Here we get the basis for a social construction of belief.  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-6152489837317930675?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='related' href='http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/BradDelongsSemi-dailyJournal/~3/rfIicW90TbE/mr-hicks-and-mr-keynes-and-the-classics-a-suggested-interpretation-a-suggested-interpretation.html' title='Keynes and uncertainty'/><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/6152489837317930675/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=6152489837317930675' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/6152489837317930675'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/6152489837317930675'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/06/keynes-and-uncertainty.html' title='Keynes and uncertainty'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-2620497140714635316</id><published>2010-06-16T06:51:00.003+01:00</published><updated>2010-06-16T06:53:55.344+01:00</updated><title type='text'>Market making or trading</title><content type='html'>There is a lot post on the &lt;a href="http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2010/06/15/261616/kerviels-cash-positions/"&gt;FT's Alphaville&lt;/a&gt; looking at the position of Jerome Kerviel.  There is a blurring of the distinction between market-maker and proprietary trader.  The fact that cash positions were carried over from one day to the next is taken as a sign that there was more than just market-making going on.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-2620497140714635316?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/2620497140714635316/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=2620497140714635316' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/2620497140714635316'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/2620497140714635316'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/06/market-making-or-trading.html' title='Market making or trading'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-2895166138851304314</id><published>2010-06-15T14:10:00.001+01:00</published><updated>2010-06-15T14:12:05.264+01:00</updated><title type='text'>Run on the bank</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://www.pepysdiary.com/archive/1667/06/13/"&gt;Pepy's diary 13th June 1667&lt;/a&gt;, in the wake of the Dutch attack on Chatam:&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Georgia, Times, serif; font-size: 13px; line-height: 23px; "&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;I presently resolved of &lt;a href="http://www.pepysdiary.com/p/154.php" style="color: rgb(106, 33, 9); text-decoration: underline; background-image: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: transparent; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; "&gt;my father’s&lt;/a&gt; and &lt;a href="http://www.pepysdiary.com/p/150.php" style="color: rgb(106, 33, 9); text-decoration: underline; background-image: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: transparent; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; "&gt;wife’s&lt;/a&gt; going into the country; and, at two hours’ warning, they did go by the coach this day, with about 1300&lt;i&gt;l.&lt;/i&gt;in gold in their night-bag. Pray God give them good passage, and good care to hide it when they come home! but my heart is full of fear: They gone, I continued in fright and fear what to do with the rest. &lt;a href="http://www.pepysdiary.com/p/1082.php" style="color: rgb(106, 33, 9); text-decoration: underline; background-image: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: transparent; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; "&gt;W. Hewer&lt;/a&gt; hath been at the banker’s, and hath got 500&lt;i&gt;l.&lt;/i&gt; out of &lt;a href="http://www.pepysdiary.com/p/967.php" style="color: rgb(106, 33, 9); text-decoration: underline; background-image: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: transparent; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; "&gt;Backewell’s&lt;/a&gt; hands of his own money; but they are so called upon that they will be all broke, hundreds coming to them for money: and their answer is, “It is payable at twenty days — when the days are out, we will pay you;” and those that are not so, they make tell over their money, and make their bags false, on purpose to give cause to retell it, and so spend time. I cannot have my 200 pieces of gold again for silver, all being bought up last night that were to be had, and sold for 24 and 25&lt;i&gt;s.&lt;/i&gt; a-piece. &lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-2895166138851304314?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/2895166138851304314/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=2895166138851304314' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/2895166138851304314'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/2895166138851304314'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/06/run-on-bank.html' title='Run on the bank'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-2608316484876913686</id><published>2010-06-11T13:05:00.003+01:00</published><updated>2010-06-12T06:12:30.230+01:00</updated><title type='text'>Power law</title><content type='html'>&lt;span class="Apple-style-span"   style="  border-collapse: collapse; font-family:arial, sans-serif;font-size:13px;"&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span"   style="  border-collapse: collapse; font-family:arial, sans-serif;font-size:13px;"&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2010/jun/10/o2-iphone-tariffs-unlimited-end"&gt;O2 indicate&lt;/a&gt; that the use of bandwidth is partly determined by a power law. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span"   style="  border-collapse: collapse; font-family:arial, sans-serif;font-size:13px;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span"   style="  border-collapse: collapse; font-family:arial, sans-serif;font-size:13px;"&gt;More &lt;a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2010/jun/11/mobile-data-unlimited-end"&gt;here&lt;/a&gt; from the Guardian.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;Instead, it said that a tiny number – just &lt;del&gt;1%&lt;/del&gt; &lt;strong&gt;0.1%&lt;/strong&gt; (&lt;em&gt;corrected: incorrect figure given by O2 initially&lt;/em&gt;) of smartphone users – are using 36% of its total mobile data traffic, and that they needed to be encouraged to change their behaviour.&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-2608316484876913686?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/2608316484876913686/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=2608316484876913686' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/2608316484876913686'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/2608316484876913686'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/06/power-law.html' title='Power law'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-963405797557459345</id><published>2010-06-01T06:59:00.002+01:00</published><updated>2010-06-01T07:02:29.050+01:00</updated><title type='text'>Identity economics</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://whimsley.typepad.com/whimsley/2010/05/identity-economics-by-george-akerlof-and-rachel-kranton-a-rambling-review.html?utm_source=feedburner&amp;amp;utm_medium=feed&amp;amp;utm_campaign=Feed%3A+Whimsley+%28Whimsley%29&amp;amp;utm_content=Google+Reader"&gt;    George Akerlof and Rachel Kranton's&lt;/a&gt; identity economics is reviewed by Whimsley.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-963405797557459345?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/963405797557459345/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=963405797557459345' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/963405797557459345'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/963405797557459345'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/06/identity-economics.html' title='Identity economics'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-4749699687497352963</id><published>2010-05-30T07:01:00.002+01:00</published><updated>2010-05-30T07:05:37.466+01:00</updated><title type='text'>Greed is good</title><content type='html'>What determines utility?  &lt;a href="http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/rob-magazine/green-from-envy/article1577630/"&gt;Eric Falkenstein&lt;/a&gt; argues that envy is more important that greed.  This is consistent with some of the findings of behavioural experiments.  This can provide a better understanding of bubbles as it would indicate that keeping up with other bubble followers is one reason that many people are sucked in.  It also suggests that the best investment strategy is one that is individualistic and greedy.  An example would be Warren Buffett and the technology boom.  It also suggests that hedge funds that follow an independent strategy and do not worry about relative performance will be better in the long run.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-4749699687497352963?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/4749699687497352963/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=4749699687497352963' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/4749699687497352963'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/4749699687497352963'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/05/greed-is-good.html' title='Greed is good'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-7998300256515959611</id><published>2010-05-30T06:46:00.003+01:00</published><updated>2010-05-30T06:47:51.484+01:00</updated><title type='text'>Subordinated debt</title><content type='html'>Amidst a discussion of the difficulties facing Greek restructuring of its debt, &lt;a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7a0fe8c2-6abb-11df-b282-00144feab49a.html"&gt;John Dizard&lt;/a&gt; gives a good overview of subordinated debt. &lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 13px; "&gt;&lt;p style="padding-left: 12px; margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 1.3em; "&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p style="padding-left: 12px; margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 1.3em; "&gt;As I have written, Greece is in a better legal position to reschedule its sovereign debt on favourable terms than, say, Argentina back at the end of 2001. About 90 per cent of Greek sovereign debt is in the form of bonds governed by Greek law.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p style="padding-left: 12px; margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 1.3em; "&gt;That means if Greece wants to reschedule the interest rate and maturity of its debt, its national parliament can just pass a law decreeing the new terms. Investors would have no legal recourse.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p style="padding-left: 12px; margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 1.3em; "&gt;The practical problem with doing that unilaterally is that Greece is still running large fiscal and trade deficits, so it cannot yet run its economy on a cash basis, as Argentina and others did after their defaults. That is why the European Union-International Monetary Fund stabilisation package is needed to cover maturing debt issues and also the continuing twin deficits, at least for the three years the facilities are supposed to be in place.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p style="padding-left: 12px; margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 1.3em; "&gt;From the Greek point of view, though, it doesn't make sense for the three-year plan to run its course, even if the country meets its financial targets. Assuming it all works, Greece would have a substantially higher debt that would not be in the form of loosely covenanted Greek-law bonds, but virtually un-defaultable obligations to European governments, the EU and the IMF. The notion that banks or bond investors would be willing, at that point, to offer deeply subordinated credit to Greece is mere fantasy.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;p style="padding-left: 12px; margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 1.3em; "&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-7998300256515959611?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/7998300256515959611/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=7998300256515959611' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/7998300256515959611'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/7998300256515959611'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/05/subordinated-debt.html' title='Subordinated debt'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-4715895772110915521</id><published>2010-05-24T20:23:00.003+01:00</published><updated>2010-05-25T14:11:55.943+01:00</updated><title type='text'>Profits from prop trading</title><content type='html'>In the continued search for profits generated by prop trading, this from the &lt;a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/3/0241c418-673d-11df-bf08-00144feab49a.html?ftcamp=rss"&gt;FT story&lt;/a&gt; on the likely effect of bank regulation on revenues&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;The so-called Volcker rule would be slightly less feared. Prop trading is not as profitable over the long run as many realise, but if banks are also forced to stop investing in hedge funds and private equity, normalised earnings could fall by about 2 per cent, according to Goldman Sachs.&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;There is also this from &lt;a href="http://www.zerohedge.com/article/beginning-end-wall-streets-various-prop-trading-desks"&gt;Tyler Durden &lt;/a&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: 'Lucida Grande', Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 13px; line-height: 17px; "&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;So with a delay of about six months since Zero Hedge started pounding on the topic of prop trading as the last bastion of perfectly legal front-running, which co-opts clients into "efficient" flow execution with the few remaining monopolist entities left on Wall Street in exchange for assorted prop trading desks taking advantage of complete flow visibility (i.e., the hedge fund nature of all modern Wall Street bail out recipients) which is simply a way to run alongside (or in front of) whale orders, thus providing guaranteed and risk free returns, the administration has finally realized what we have claimed for many months: that prop trading is nothing but a quasi-illegal operation, which was made explicitly and perfectly permissible with the adoption of the disastrous Gramm-Leach-Bliley act. As long as prop trading exists, Goldman (which is reporting earnings tomorrow, and we expect will announce another quarter of 90%+ profitable trading days only thanks to it taking full advantage of a thorough visibility of the FICC and equity flow market and a commingled prop and flow order book) will have record earnings, until such time as the Minsky Moment in Goldman's balance sheet arises again and blows up the financial system one more time.&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-4715895772110915521?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/4715895772110915521/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=4715895772110915521' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/4715895772110915521'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/4715895772110915521'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/05/profits-from-prop-trading.html' title='Profits from prop trading'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-1925018292317858564</id><published>2010-05-24T06:39:00.002+01:00</published><updated>2010-05-24T06:44:45.671+01:00</updated><title type='text'>Measuring inflation</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/commentary/2010/2010-2.cfm"&gt;The Cleveland Fed report&lt;/a&gt;s some new research by Bryan and Meyer that tries to break price  changes down into those that are frequent and those that happen only occasionally.  The occasional changes are seen as being affected by the outlook for future inflation and therefore provide a signal about inflation expectations.  They produce a flexible price index and a sticky price index.  The sticky price index seems to contain some valuable information that improves the forecast of future inflation.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-1925018292317858564?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/1925018292317858564/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=1925018292317858564' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/1925018292317858564'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/1925018292317858564'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/05/measuring-inflation.html' title='Measuring inflation'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-1426856339362650877</id><published>2010-05-19T20:25:00.002+01:00</published><updated>2010-05-19T20:28:27.656+01:00</updated><title type='text'>No need for bank diversification?</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://traxfer.ft.com/cms/s/3/de9df4f4-6350-11df-a844-00144feab49a.html?o=%2Flex"&gt;The FT's Lex &lt;/a&gt;asks why BoA is divesting assets in strongly growing Brazil and concludes that  increased  capital requirements and  reduced leverage reduces the need for diversification to stabilise earnings.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;br /&gt;A potential answer is that global banking models are being subtly revised in response to increased regulation. One of the little understood mysteries of the boom years is why banks expanded internationally when there were no synergy benefits and shareholders could themselves diversify more efficiently. The reason was leverage: if you are 30 times geared, it is crucial to have a stable earnings base. Geographic diversification was one way to get it, even if returns in individual countries were low.&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-1426856339362650877?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/1426856339362650877/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=1426856339362650877' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/1426856339362650877'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/1426856339362650877'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/05/no-need-for-bank-diversification.html' title='No need for bank diversification?'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-5154861778320489230</id><published>2010-05-10T05:38:00.003+01:00</published><updated>2010-05-11T05:51:49.362+01:00</updated><title type='text'>Exchanges, liquidity and stock gyrations</title><content type='html'>The wild swings in US equity markets that were seen last Thursday have generated a lot of talk about the current structure of equity markets and the increased role of automated trading.  &lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;It appears that, with multiple exchanges, the closure of some markets may just  increase the reliance on more peripheral, less liquid alternatives.  The traditional specialist on the floor of the NYSE is no longer a backstop to prevent a collapse in price.  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.econbrowser.com/archives/2010/05/staying_sane_in.html"&gt;James Hamilton&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span"   style="  border-collapse: collapse; font-family:arial, sans-serif;font-size:13px;"&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;Another notion that's popular with many financial gurus these days is the claim that you can eliminate certain risks to your portfolio with the right strategy of automatic trading and stop-loss sell orders. Again that claim invites an economic question-- if you are getting an insurance policy, who is selling it to you? I believe the implicit answer is, you are counting on the market-maker to insure you by taking the other side of your escape transactions. But the curious thing about such an insurance policy is that the market-maker gets to decide what premium to charge you &lt;em&gt;after&lt;/em&gt; you ask to collect on the policy. You just might find that the state of the world when you and your buddies all most desperately want to cash in on your insurance is exactly the time when the premium proves to be ruinously expensive.&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;a href="http://paul.kedrosky.com/archives/2010/05/run_on_the_shad.html?utm_source=feedburner&amp;amp;utm_medium=feed&amp;amp;utm_campaign=Feed:+InfectiousGreed+(Paul+Kedrosky's+Infectious+Greed)"&gt;Paul Kedrosky&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span"   style="  color: rgb(51, 51, 51); line-height: 16px; font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:13px;"&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;But all of this changes market microstructure in insidiously destabilizing ways. For the first time we have large providers of this shadow liquidity, algorithms and high-frequency sorts, that individually account for large percentages of daily trading activity, and, at the same time, that can be turned off with a switch, or at an algorithmic whim. As a result, in market crises, when liquidity was always hardest to find, it now doesn't just become hard to find, it disappears altogether, like water rushing out sight via a trapdoor to hell. Old-style market-makers are standing aside as panicky orders pour in, and they look straight at shadow liquidity providers and say, "No thanks. You battle bots take it". And, they don't&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c1b46646-5a38-11df-acdc-00144feab49a.html"&gt;The FT &lt;/a&gt;on algorithmic trading. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/781c4e6e-5c62-11df-93f6-00144feab49a.html"&gt;The FT&lt;/a&gt; looks at the regulatory impact.  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 13px; "&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;Larry Tabb, chief executive of consultancy The Tabb Group, says: “We really need to step back and think about centralisation versus fragmentation and who is providing liquidity. It opens the up market to a whole series of questions about how we want our markets to function.”&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-5154861778320489230?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/5154861778320489230/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=5154861778320489230' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/5154861778320489230'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/5154861778320489230'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/05/exchanges-liquidity-and-stock-gyrations.html' title='Exchanges, liquidity and stock gyrations'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-1194216013822364286</id><published>2010-05-08T07:00:00.000+01:00</published><updated>2010-05-08T07:01:12.161+01:00</updated><title type='text'>Trading Places</title><content type='html'>&lt;object width="640" height="385"&gt;&lt;param name="movie" value="http://www.youtube.com/v/RAXdie_gifI&amp;amp;color1=0xb1b1b1&amp;amp;color2=0xd0d0d0&amp;amp;hl=en_US&amp;amp;feature=player_embedded&amp;amp;fs=1"&gt;&lt;/param&gt;&lt;param name="allowFullScreen" value="true"&gt;&lt;/param&gt;&lt;param name="allowScriptAccess" value="always"&gt;&lt;/param&gt;&lt;embed src="http://www.youtube.com/v/RAXdie_gifI&amp;amp;color1=0xb1b1b1&amp;amp;color2=0xd0d0d0&amp;amp;hl=en_US&amp;amp;feature=player_embedded&amp;amp;fs=1" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" allowfullscreen="true" allowscriptaccess="always" width="640" height="385"&gt;&lt;/embed&gt;&lt;/object&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-1194216013822364286?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/1194216013822364286/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=1194216013822364286' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/1194216013822364286'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/1194216013822364286'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/05/trading-places.html' title='Trading Places'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-2874729039698415070</id><published>2010-05-06T06:03:00.002+01:00</published><updated>2010-05-06T06:04:29.747+01:00</updated><title type='text'>Increased risk</title><content type='html'>European banks are suffering increased funding costs as a result of fears over Greek contagion.  &lt;a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0be6616e-586e-11df-9921-00144feab49a.html"&gt;From the FT&lt;/a&gt;.  &lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 13px; "&gt;&lt;p style="padding-left: 12px; margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 1.3em; "&gt;A key measure of bank risk, the overnight index swap spread on futures contracts in the eurozone, rose to a record high this week. This measures the premium over “risk-free” overnight rates of three-month rates, which carry greater credit risk.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p style="padding-left: 12px; margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 1.3em; "&gt;Another warning sign is a significant shift to overnight lending by banks, particularly within troubled areas of the eurozone. Of the €450bn ($589bn) in daily turnover in the European money markets, 90 per cent is now in overnight lending, according to interdealer broker&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-2874729039698415070?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/2874729039698415070/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=2874729039698415070' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/2874729039698415070'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/2874729039698415070'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/05/increased-risk.html' title='Increased risk'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-5280368609221728163</id><published>2010-05-03T05:57:00.000+01:00</published><updated>2010-05-03T05:58:47.418+01:00</updated><title type='text'>Article 125 of the Lisbon Treaty</title><content type='html'>&lt;span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 11px; -webkit-border-horizontal-spacing: 2px; -webkit-border-vertical-spacing: 2px; "&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;1. The Union shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of any Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project. A Member State shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of another Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;2. The Council, on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, may, as required, specify definitions for the application of the prohibitions referred to in Articles 123 and 124 and in this Article.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-5280368609221728163?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='related' href='http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty/treaty-on-the-functioning-of-the-european-union-and-comments/part-3-union-policies-and-internal-actions/title-viii-economic-and-monetary-policy/chapter-1-economic-policy/393-article-125.html' title='Article 125 of the Lisbon Treaty'/><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/5280368609221728163/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=5280368609221728163' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/5280368609221728163'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/5280368609221728163'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/05/article-125-of-lisbon-treaty.html' title='Article 125 of the Lisbon Treaty'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-4762363532350415670</id><published>2010-04-23T06:37:00.002+01:00</published><updated>2010-04-23T06:41:12.497+01:00</updated><title type='text'>Deep knowledge</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e65258e4-4e64-11df-b48d-00144feab49a.html"&gt;The FT &lt;/a&gt;covers the case against the rating agencies and highlights the fact that there was knowledge within the institution about the reputational risk being taken.  The FT suggests that this was profit-motivated, which is certainly part of the story. However, it may also be the case that these dispirit, lower-level voices could not be hear above the jingling of the tills ringing in new business.  The challenge of governance is to give more weight to these voices. &lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 13px; "&gt;&lt;p style="padding-left: 12px; margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 1.3em; "&gt;he e-mails show signs of the agencies’ knowledge of the impending financial collapse. But in the interests of maintaining market share both S&amp;amp;P and Moody’s felt the need to continue their practices – even though many employees had misgivings.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p style="padding-left: 12px; margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 1.3em; "&gt;“Screwing with (the model’s) criteria to ‘get the deal’ is putting the entire S&amp;amp;P franchise at risk – it’s a bad idea,” said one S&amp;amp;P employee. Another S&amp;amp;P employee described the drive for revenue and its effect on the relationship between banks and rating agencies as “a kind of Stockholm syndrome”.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p style="padding-left: 12px; margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 1.3em; "&gt;Yet another captures that alleged conflict of interest almost perfectly: “Rating agencies continue to create an even bigger monster – the CDO market,” wrote an S&amp;amp;P staffer. “Let’s hope we are all retired by the time this house of cards falters.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p style="padding-left: 12px; margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 1.3em; "&gt;The agencies also failed to incorporate their growing awareness of fraud in the lending industry into their rating practices, as it was seen as a potential block to revenue.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p style="padding-left: 12px; margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 1.3em; "&gt;In January 2007, an S&amp;amp;P analyst rating a Goldman Sachs CDO with subprime loans issued by Fremont Investment and Loan, which had just stopped using 8,000 of its brokers because they were agreeing loans with some of the highest delinquency rates in the country, asked superiors whether to take Fremont’s reputation into account.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-4762363532350415670?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/4762363532350415670/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=4762363532350415670' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/4762363532350415670'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/4762363532350415670'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/04/deep-knowledge.html' title='Deep knowledge'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-5875075278094325332</id><published>2010-04-10T15:29:00.001+01:00</published><updated>2010-04-10T15:30:29.021+01:00</updated><title type='text'>Speculation</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://www.pepysdiary.com/archive/1667/03/15/"&gt;Pepy's diary 15th March 1666&lt;/a&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Georgia, Times, serif; font-size: 13px; line-height: 23px; "&gt; So I to &lt;a href="http://www.pepysdiary.com/p/483.php" style="color: rgb(106, 33, 9); text-decoration: underline; background-image: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: transparent; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; "&gt;the office&lt;/a&gt; all the morning, and at noon to &lt;a href="http://www.pepysdiary.com/p/189.php" style="color: rgb(106, 33, 9); text-decoration: underline; background-image: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: transparent; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; "&gt;the ‘Change&lt;/a&gt;, where I do hear that letters this day come to Court do tell us that we are likely not to agree, the Dutch demanding high terms, and the &lt;a href="http://www.pepysdiary.com/p/5855.php" style="color: rgb(106, 33, 9); text-decoration: underline; background-image: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial; background-color: transparent; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; "&gt;King of France&lt;/a&gt; the like, in a most braving manner. The merchants do give themselves over for lost, no man knowing what to do, whether to sell or buy, not knowing whether peace or war to expect, and I am told that could that be now known a man might get 20,000&lt;i&gt;l.&lt;/i&gt; in a week’s time by buying up of goods in case there should be war.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-5875075278094325332?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/5875075278094325332/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=5875075278094325332' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/5875075278094325332'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/5875075278094325332'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/04/speculation.html' title='Speculation'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-8850301282610798074</id><published>2010-04-09T08:17:00.002+01:00</published><updated>2010-04-09T08:20:18.117+01:00</updated><title type='text'>CDS</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://www.johnkay.com/2010/04/07/of-cows-communities-and-credit-default-swaps/"&gt;John Kay &lt;/a&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Georgia, Verdana, Helvetica; font-size: 14px; line-height: 19px; "&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;But it strains language to breaking point to describe CDS transactions as anything but gambling. The traders in AIG’s financial products division were inheritors of the amusements of Edward Lloyd’s coffee shop rather than the values of Swiss farmers.&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Georgia, Verdana, Helvetica; font-size: 14px; line-height: 19px; "&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Georgia, Verdana, Helvetica; font-size: 14px; line-height: 19px; "&gt;I am not sure that this is an accurate description. It seems to me that AIG was taking the risk from the Swiss farmers and receiving the income for total collapse that they did not believe could happen.  However, when all the crops failed, AIG could not compensate the farmers and had to be bailed out by the government.   There is speculative trading there, but it is not being done by AIG. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-8850301282610798074?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/8850301282610798074/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=8850301282610798074' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/8850301282610798074'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/8850301282610798074'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/04/cds.html' title='CDS'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-4368277493638588868</id><published>2010-04-06T13:51:00.002+01:00</published><updated>2010-04-06T13:57:36.262+01:00</updated><title type='text'>Theomdynamics</title><content type='html'>The first and second laws of thermodynamics:  work uses energy and systems are inefficient.  A good example with Google search in &lt;a href="http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20627546.700-search-engines-dirty-secret.html?DCMP=OTC-rss&amp;amp;nsref=online-news"&gt;New Scientist&lt;/a&gt;.  However, as if often the case when talking about thermodynamics and economics, there is no accounting for the fact that society, unlike the real world, can create something out of nothing.  &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Things like economies of scale and network effects have confounded people from Smith to Malthus to Marx.  In this case, there is a need to compare the cost (lightbulb for one hour) against any possible benefit.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-4368277493638588868?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/4368277493638588868/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=4368277493638588868' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/4368277493638588868'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/4368277493638588868'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/04/theomdynamics.html' title='Theomdynamics'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-289034818821931628</id><published>2010-04-06T12:54:00.002+01:00</published><updated>2010-04-06T12:56:57.029+01:00</updated><title type='text'>Currency swap</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9dc43bb8-415f-11df-adec-00144feabdc0.html?ftcamp=rss"&gt;The FT &lt;/a&gt;reports that Greece may try to tap US investors with a US dollar-denominated bond, giving some evidence of institutional features that may justify currency swaps.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;Greece’s most recent sales of euro-denominated bonds have attracted lower levels of interest and &lt;a class="bodystrong" target="_blank" title="FT: Greece to target US investors with bond" href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5427bfe4-40f0-11df-94c2-00144feabdc0.html"&gt;the government is now aiming to issue in dollars&lt;/a&gt;, targeting emerging market investors who are attracted by higher yields.&lt;/blockquote&gt; &lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-289034818821931628?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/289034818821931628/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=289034818821931628' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/289034818821931628'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/289034818821931628'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/04/currency-swap.html' title='Currency swap'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-8466066924195622802</id><published>2010-04-06T09:04:00.003+01:00</published><updated>2010-04-06T16:14:14.868+01:00</updated><title type='text'>Bond model</title><content type='html'>Here are some links to research on the yield curve. &lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.econbrowser.com/archives/2006/07/reading_the_yie.html"&gt;http://www.econbrowser.com/archives/2006/07/reading_the_yie.html&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.econbrowser.com/archives/2006/12/the_yield_curve_3.html"&gt;http://www.econbrowser.com/archives/2006/11/the_yield_curve_2.html&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;a href="http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2006/09/globalization_a.html"&gt;http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2006/09/globalization_a.html&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.econbrowser.com/archives/2009/04/the_yield_curve_6.html"&gt;http://www.econbrowser.com/archives/2009/04/the_yield_curve_6.html&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.econbrowser.com/archives/2006/04/the_yield_curve.html"&gt;http://www.econbrowser.com/archives/2006/04/the_yield_curve.html&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;a href="http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2008/02/accounting-for.html"&gt;http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2008/02/accounting-for.html&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;a href="http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2005/06/speculation_on_.html"&gt;http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2005/06/speculation_on_.html&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;a href="http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2006/01/why_is_the_yiel.html"&gt;http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2006/01/why_is_the_yiel.html&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-8466066924195622802?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/8466066924195622802/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=8466066924195622802' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/8466066924195622802'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/8466066924195622802'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/04/bond-model.html' title='Bond model'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-4019055802771660022</id><published>2010-04-03T08:22:00.002+01:00</published><updated>2010-04-03T08:23:19.886+01:00</updated><title type='text'></title><content type='html'>Though funding costs are high, there is ample demand at the long end of the market.  &lt;a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/59456c62-3e87-11df-a706-00144feabdc0.html"&gt;The FT&lt;/a&gt; reports. &lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 13px; "&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;Indeed, the first plea of Joanne Segars, the NAPF chief executive in its pre-Budget submission was to ask that borrowing be tilted to the long end of the market where it can do the most to alleviate funding woes for pensions. Already, government issuance of 20-, 30- and 50-year debt has risen sharply. In the fiscal year ending April 2010, issuance of conventional long-dated gilts soared to £33.9bn from £23.4bn just two years earlier. Thirty-year yields have risen, too, from 4.09 per cent at September 30 2009 to 4.52 per cent as at March 31 2010&lt;/blockquote&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-4019055802771660022?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/4019055802771660022/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=4019055802771660022' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/4019055802771660022'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/4019055802771660022'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/04/though-funding-costs-are-high-there-is.html' title=''/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-5738385193829256790</id><published>2010-03-31T12:23:00.001+01:00</published><updated>2010-03-31T12:24:37.624+01:00</updated><title type='text'>Crisis, margin and profits</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/3/ff6c8f56-3c9f-11df-89ca-00144feabdc0.html?ftcamp=rss"&gt;The FT&lt;/a&gt; reports the fall back in margins towards pre-crisis levels. &lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 13px; "&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;The trouble is, with margins near pre-crisis levels again for products like rates and forex, the free lunch enjoyed by the smaller boys is being taken away. Scale once more is king. Banks down the order in certain flow products should be asking themselves serious questions. Even including the crisis, the top five banks in equities, for example, have increased their market share by 10 per cent since 2006. As the level of concentration increases again, expect more money – not to mention heat – to be generated in the biggest dealing rooms.&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-5738385193829256790?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/5738385193829256790/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=5738385193829256790' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/5738385193829256790'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/5738385193829256790'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/03/crisis-margin-and-profits.html' title='Crisis, margin and profits'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-7440523300548230608</id><published>2010-03-31T09:00:00.003+01:00</published><updated>2010-03-31T09:03:14.862+01:00</updated><title type='text'>Swaps and noise</title><content type='html'>Here is an example &lt;a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4f3f237c-3c46-11df-b316-00144feabdc0.html?ftcamp=rss"&gt;from the FT&lt;/a&gt; about how arbitrage opportunity may be squeezed by noise.  &lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 13px; "&gt;&lt;p style="padding-left: 12px; margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 1.3em; "&gt;In the wake of the financial crisis, the use of collateral backing derivative trades in order to appease counterparty credit concerns has continued to expand.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p style="padding-left: 12px; margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 1.3em; "&gt;This means that once a swap trade is executed, more margin is required if the trade starts losing money.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p style="padding-left: 12px; margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 1.3em; "&gt;This daily management of margin also makes it harder to maintain an arbitrage over time as the value of any trade between swaps and Treasuries changes constantly.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p style="padding-left: 12px; margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 1.3em; "&gt;Analysts at Credit Suisse say: “This makes it increasingly harder to hold arbitrage strategies to termination as arbitrageurs are forced to realise not just gains but also losses through margin calls resulting in frequent stop outs [forced exits from the trade].&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;The risk that the trade will move further in the wrong direction before convergence is achieved will limit those willing to take the risk and create some sort of threshold on arbitrage. This may be like a threshold error correction model similar to that seen in PPP.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-7440523300548230608?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/7440523300548230608/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=7440523300548230608' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/7440523300548230608'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/7440523300548230608'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/03/swaps-and-noise.html' title='Swaps and noise'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-4678134791386004805</id><published>2010-03-30T08:30:00.003+01:00</published><updated>2010-03-30T08:30:52.615+01:00</updated><title type='text'>Growth and bubbles</title><content type='html'>Here is a section on bubbles and the growth rate by &lt;a href="http://worthwhile.typepad.com/worthwhile_canadian_initi/2010/03/the-supply-and-demand-for-bubbles.html"&gt;Nick Row.&lt;/a&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-4678134791386004805?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/4678134791386004805/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=4678134791386004805' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/4678134791386004805'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/4678134791386004805'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/03/growth-and-bubbles.html' title='Growth and bubbles'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-6432120533187953036</id><published>2010-03-28T14:18:00.002+01:00</published><updated>2010-03-28T14:20:41.065+01:00</updated><title type='text'>Shorting bonds</title><content type='html'>A small &lt;a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ac37010e-3907-11df-8970-00144feabdc0.html"&gt;FT item&lt;/a&gt; on shorting the bond market.  There are a number of different ways to do this:  futures, repos or CDS.  &lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 13px; "&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;Shorting bonds can be done using futures or repos [repurchase agreements], or credit default swaps. The last method is not ideal, warned Mr Inker. “There is the risk of governments declaring your contract invalid.” A number of politicians have called for restrictions on CDS trading.&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;This is a strategy designed to enhance yield in a low interest rate world.  Risk-reward is in favour of high yields. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-6432120533187953036?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/6432120533187953036/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=6432120533187953036' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/6432120533187953036'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/6432120533187953036'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/03/shorting-bonds.html' title='Shorting bonds'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-8306593125980802095</id><published>2010-03-18T06:27:00.002Z</published><updated>2010-03-18T06:36:58.777Z</updated><title type='text'>Informal contracts</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://www.johnkay.com/2010/03/17/think-before-you-tear-up-an-unwritten-contract/"&gt;John Kay&lt;/a&gt; summarises the difference between informal and explicit contacts echoing ideas about the need for flexibility in relationships that cover the question of where the firm should end and the nature of the legal background to firm formation:  Coase and Williamson highlight some of these issues as informal and adaptive relationships may be more easily managed within the firm.  &lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Georgia, Verdana, Helvetica; font-size: 14px; line-height: 19px; "&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;Lawyers for American companies spent hundreds of billable hours drawing up contracts to which no one ever referred. Their Japanese counterparts engaged in complex business relationships with no formal agreements at all, or ones that covered a single sheet of paper. But the commercial relationships that emerged in Japan’s car industry were more successful in securing component reliability and managing just-in-time inventory than those hammered out by the hard-nosed negotiators of Detroit.&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;La Porta, DeSilanes, Shliefer and Vishney "Legal Determinants of External Finance" seem to suggest that a more flexible legal system can also better deal with the heterogeneity of conflicts. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-8306593125980802095?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/8306593125980802095/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=8306593125980802095' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/8306593125980802095'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/8306593125980802095'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/03/informal-contracts.html' title='Informal contracts'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-4927697638175943160</id><published>2010-03-18T06:10:00.003Z</published><updated>2010-03-18T06:11:42.492Z</updated><title type='text'>Banking, risk and regulation</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9575ec0a-31e6-11df-a8d1-00144feabdc0.html"&gt;Excellent article&lt;/a&gt; on risk and regulation that looks at the key issues of failure in safe securities and repo markets. &lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 13px; "&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;The financial crisis of 2007-09 featured large-scale losses to financial institutions from assets such as AAA rated tranches of mortgage-backed securities. Simultaneously, markets for collateralised borrowing (“repos” or repurchase agreements) froze or experienced severe stress. Investors lending in repo transactions started charging large “haircuts”. In other words, repos could be rolled over only with successively high levels of over-collateralisation, which disrupted the financing model of broker-dealers and in fact caused Bear Stearns to fail in March 2008.&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;The moral of the story is that regulators need to impose tighter constraints, such as higher capital requirements, on activities such as holdings of AAA rated tranches and repo financing of risky assets where there is a conflict of interest between the privately optimal and socially optimal choices. Bankers will fight such a proposal. But it should be well understood that they have all incentives to ignore the attendant systemic risk&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-4927697638175943160?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/4927697638175943160/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=4927697638175943160' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/4927697638175943160'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/4927697638175943160'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/03/banking-risk-and-regulation.html' title='Banking, risk and regulation'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-2561950560361189737</id><published>2010-03-16T06:47:00.000Z</published><updated>2010-03-16T06:47:55.169Z</updated><title type='text'>Minsky and risk</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://rajivsethi.blogspot.com/2010/03/ecological-perspective-on-financial.html"&gt;Rajiv Sethi: An Ecological Perspective on Financial Market Reform&lt;/a&gt; speaks about Minsky and the way that risk was built at financial institutions.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-2561950560361189737?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/2561950560361189737/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=2561950560361189737' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/2561950560361189737'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/2561950560361189737'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/03/minsky-and-risk.html' title='Minsky and risk'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-3163441722407453385</id><published>2010-03-15T19:24:00.001Z</published><updated>2010-03-15T19:25:34.706Z</updated><title type='text'>Swap rates</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a4932f76-3057-11df-bc4a-00144feabdc0.html"&gt;The FT &lt;/a&gt;on the relationship between government issuance and swap rates.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In normal market conditions, yields on government bonds, such as US Treasuries, UK gilts and German Bunds, trade at a discount to swap rates. This is because swap rates are based on a funding rate that is linked to the interbank lending market. This rate is higher than the repo rate used for financing government bonds. Swaps are money market instruments whereas Treasuries reflect triple A sovereign risk.&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-3163441722407453385?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/3163441722407453385/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=3163441722407453385' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/3163441722407453385'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/3163441722407453385'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/03/swap-rates.html' title='Swap rates'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-7398619917600441862</id><published>2010-03-13T07:07:00.002Z</published><updated>2010-03-13T07:09:19.868Z</updated><title type='text'>Toxic asset</title><content type='html'>Track a toxic asset with &lt;a href="http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=124587240"&gt;NPR. &lt;/a&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span"   style="  color: rgb(85, 85, 85); line-height: 16px; font-family:arial, sans-serif;font-size:13px;"&gt;Remember those complicated bonds full of home mortgages? The ones that almost brought down the economy? A team of reporters with NPR's Planet Money used $1,000 of their own cash to buy a tiny piece of one — and plan to track it until it dies&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-7398619917600441862?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/7398619917600441862/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=7398619917600441862' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/7398619917600441862'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/7398619917600441862'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/03/toxic-asset.html' title='Toxic asset'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-4109672628670561770</id><published>2010-03-12T10:58:00.002Z</published><updated>2010-03-12T11:00:39.214Z</updated><title type='text'>Extreme value</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://blogperso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/index.php/post/2010/03/05/Ecart-absolue-ou-%C3%A9cart-type"&gt;Arthur Charpentier&lt;/a&gt; shows very clearly the way that mean square error and average absolute error can diverge as outliers appear. &lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px; line-height: 20px; "&gt;(I allowed negative income for simple calculations and have a nice design). We concluded that gap significantly different between the standard deviation (L2) and the absolute difference (L1) simply means that there are probably outliers in the database (outliers defined &lt;em style="margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px; padding-top: 0px; padding-right: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; padding-left: 0px; border-top-width: 0px; border-right-width: 0px; border-bottom-width: 0px; border-left-width: 0px; border-style: initial; border-color: initial; "&gt;"significantly &lt;/em&gt;different" means " &lt;em style="margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px; padding-top: 0px; padding-right: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; padding-left: 0px; border-top-width: 0px; border-right-width: 0px; border-bottom-width: 0px; border-left-width: 0px; border-style: initial; border-color: initial; "&gt;outliers &lt;/em&gt;").&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px; line-height: 20px; "&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px; line-height: 20px; "&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-4109672628670561770?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/4109672628670561770/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=4109672628670561770' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/4109672628670561770'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/4109672628670561770'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/03/extreme-value.html' title='Extreme value'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-6686514415182985789</id><published>2010-03-12T06:21:00.004Z</published><updated>2010-03-12T06:24:03.605Z</updated><title type='text'>Lehman</title><content type='html'>&lt;span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: medium;"&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1be0aca2-2d79-11df-a262-00144feabdc0.html"&gt;The FT&lt;/a&gt; looks at the Lehman repo transactions but what stands out is the huge increase in risk-taking.  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: medium;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; "&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: medium;"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: medium;"&gt;Lehman’s rapid growth saw net assets increase by 48 per cent, or almost $128bn, from the fourth quarter of 2006 through the first quarter of 2008. But the bulk of the assets, according to the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a class="bodystrong" target="_blank" title="FT - Report faults Lehman executives" href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2e412d50-2d6e-11df-a262-00144feabdc0.html" style="text-decoration: none; color: rgb(0, 51, 153); font-weight: 700; "&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: medium;"&gt;report&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: medium;"&gt; by court-appointed examiner &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a class="bodystrong" target="_blank" title="FT - Valukas report finds few heroes" href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/09d2f184-2d6d-11df-a262-00144feabdc0.htmlF" style="text-decoration: none; color: rgb(0, 51, 153); font-weight: 700; "&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: medium;"&gt;Anton Valukas&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: medium;"&gt;released on Thursday, were in illiquid assets that could not easily be sold. Such assets nearly doubled to $175bn in that same time frame&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: medium;"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; "&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: medium;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; "&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: medium;"&gt;The repo issue is that this was used to disguise the extent of the leverage and the precarious financial position that the investment bank had engineered.  If they were conducting this financial engineering, they were aware of the increase in risk that was being taken. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-6686514415182985789?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/6686514415182985789/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=6686514415182985789' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/6686514415182985789'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/6686514415182985789'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/03/lehman.html' title='Lehman'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-176449181002322862</id><published>2010-02-22T07:26:00.000Z</published><updated>2010-02-22T07:27:29.231Z</updated><title type='text'>Sussex history</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://www.ebooksread.com/authors-eng/charles-thomas-stanford/sussex-in-the-great-civil-war-and-the-interregnum-1642-1660-ala/page-22-sussex-in-the-great-civil-war-and-the-interregnum-1642-1660-ala.shtml"&gt;Sussex history and Charles 2.&lt;/a&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-176449181002322862?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/176449181002322862/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=176449181002322862' title='1 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/176449181002322862'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/176449181002322862'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/02/sussex-history.html' title='Sussex history'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>1</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-3294313949106433132</id><published>2010-02-20T13:27:00.002Z</published><updated>2010-02-20T13:29:53.370Z</updated><title type='text'>Moral Hazard and selection</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/EconomistsView/~3/_AxLqlSn1bY/natural-selection-selfdeception-and-the-moral-hazard-explanation-of-the-financial-crisis.html"&gt;Mark Thoma &lt;/a&gt;puts together an excellent item on moral hazard and natural selection.  The banks do not even have to believe that what they are doing is risky.  So long as the most successful continue to rise and the relative failures throw in the towel, risk will increase.  There is also a good point about the nature of beliefs and the way that they are only over-turned after sufficient weight of contrary evidence. &lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-3294313949106433132?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/3294313949106433132/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=3294313949106433132' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/3294313949106433132'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/3294313949106433132'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/02/moral-hazard-and-selection.html' title='Moral Hazard and selection'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-8032507105073847589</id><published>2010-02-20T08:49:00.002Z</published><updated>2010-02-20T08:50:09.195Z</updated><title type='text'>Robin Hood Tax</title><content type='html'>A nice example from &lt;a href="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/TimHarford/~3/H1uITLJPTik/"&gt;Tim Harford &lt;/a&gt;of the risk that Tobin tax increases volatility. &lt;div&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px; border-collapse: collapse; "&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;The tax would certainly be attractive if, like a tax on carbon dioxide or congestion, it reduced destructive activities. But would it? James Tobin and John Maynard Keynes both proposed taxes on financial transactions and each believed that the tax would reduce financial volatility. This is possible but far from obvious, when you realise that the tax might encourage bigger, more irregular financial transactions. An analogy: if I have to pay a charge whenever I use a cash machine, I make fewer, larger withdrawals and the amount of money in my wallet fluctuates more widely. Bear in mind, too, that the most bubble-prone asset market is for housing, which is bought in very lumpy, long-term chunks&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-8032507105073847589?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/8032507105073847589/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=8032507105073847589' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/8032507105073847589'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/8032507105073847589'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/02/robin-hood-tax.html' title='Robin Hood Tax'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-4480339052801522450</id><published>2010-02-18T05:49:00.003Z</published><updated>2010-02-18T05:51:33.942Z</updated><title type='text'>Governance</title><content type='html'>John Lewis vs EasyJet.   Below the political rhetoric is an interesting argument over the nature of governance.  Labour plans to concentrate on mutualism with people paid to participate; the Conservatives aim for pick-and-mix services.  &lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;From &lt;a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/feb/17/labour-rebrand-lambeth-john-lewis-council"&gt;the Guardian&lt;/a&gt;. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px; border-collapse: collapse; "&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;Labour is planning to rebrand one of its local authorities as Britain's first "John Lewis council", offering council tax rebates to residents in exchange for helping to run services, in a direct challenge to the Conservatives' pioneering "easyCouncil".&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-4480339052801522450?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/4480339052801522450/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=4480339052801522450' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/4480339052801522450'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/4480339052801522450'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/02/governance.html' title='Governance'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-8249811553966507837</id><published>2010-02-09T06:14:00.002Z</published><updated>2010-02-09T06:15:13.342Z</updated><title type='text'>Paul Samuelson</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/johncassidy/2009/12/postscript-paul-samuelson.html"&gt;In the New Yorker&lt;/a&gt; being interviewed by John Cassidy.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-8249811553966507837?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/8249811553966507837/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=8249811553966507837' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/8249811553966507837'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/8249811553966507837'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/02/paul-samuelson.html' title='Paul Samuelson'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-2978143723728864672</id><published>2010-02-06T05:48:00.002Z</published><updated>2010-02-06T05:48:57.144Z</updated><title type='text'>Rights issue</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/926d9f2a-0ec4-11df-bd79-00144feabdc0.html"&gt;This &lt;/a&gt;is a very good overview of rights issue regulations around the world from the FT.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-2978143723728864672?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/2978143723728864672/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=2978143723728864672' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/2978143723728864672'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/2978143723728864672'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/02/rights-issue.html' title='Rights issue'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-1638382493832289499</id><published>2010-02-04T10:06:00.001Z</published><updated>2010-02-04T10:07:44.694Z</updated><title type='text'>Chinese revaluation</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2010/02/obama-vows-to-address-yuan-exchange.html"&gt;Calculated Risk &lt;/a&gt;links to a number of sites talking about Chinese revaluation.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-1638382493832289499?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/1638382493832289499/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=1638382493832289499' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/1638382493832289499'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/1638382493832289499'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/02/chinese-revaluation.html' title='Chinese revaluation'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-7912863942115375845</id><published>2010-01-28T16:32:00.003Z</published><updated>2010-01-28T16:42:33.630Z</updated><title type='text'>Interest rates and financial growth</title><content type='html'>Looking at the relationship between the level of interest rates and the size of the financial sector suggests that relatively high interest rates encourage the growth of the financial sector.  The high interest rates allow an inflow of funds which have to be managed. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;This can take a panel analysis.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;1990 or first available year 2007 or latest available year average interest rate&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;India &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;      &lt;/span&gt;11.9 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;14.2&lt;br /&gt;Russian Federation &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;   &lt;/span&gt;0.8 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;   &lt;/span&gt;14.7 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;8.86&lt;br /&gt;Slovak Republic &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;    &lt;/span&gt;14.8 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;16.9 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;4.93&lt;br /&gt;Czech Republic &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;    &lt;/span&gt;16.9 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;17.3 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;3.24&lt;br /&gt;Norway &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;      &lt;/span&gt;17.4 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;17.9 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;4.59&lt;br /&gt;Poland &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;      &lt;/span&gt;10 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;   &lt;/span&gt;18.4 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;8.42&lt;br /&gt;Greece &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;      &lt;/span&gt;16.7 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;19.4&lt;br /&gt;Turkey &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;      &lt;/span&gt;11 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;   &lt;/span&gt;20.2 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;17.5&lt;br /&gt;Mexico &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;      &lt;/span&gt;20.7 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;20.3 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;9.31&lt;br /&gt;Finland &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;      &lt;/span&gt;16.2 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;21.2 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;3.18&lt;br /&gt;Korea &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;      &lt;/span&gt;14.9 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;21.6 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;4.67&lt;br /&gt;Spain &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;      &lt;/span&gt;17.2 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;22.1 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;3.18&lt;br /&gt;South Africa &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;     &lt;/span&gt;16.1 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;22.1 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;9.12&lt;br /&gt;Portugal &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;     &lt;/span&gt;20.2 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;22.4 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;3.18&lt;br /&gt;Hungary &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;     &lt;/span&gt;14.6 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;22.6 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;4.9&lt;br /&gt;Switzerland &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;     &lt;/span&gt;16.2 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;23.6 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;1.58&lt;br /&gt;Austria &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;      &lt;/span&gt;17.7 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;24.2 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;3.18&lt;br /&gt;Denmark &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;     &lt;/span&gt;21.5 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;24.7 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;3.38&lt;br /&gt;Sweden &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;      &lt;/span&gt;20.3 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;24.8 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;2.91&lt;br /&gt;Brazil &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;      &lt;/span&gt;25.4&lt;br /&gt;Canada &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;      &lt;/span&gt;22.7 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;25.6 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;3.32&lt;br /&gt;Iceland&lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;      &lt;/span&gt;16.7 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;26.2 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;10.63&lt;br /&gt;Japan &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;      &lt;/span&gt;20.7 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;26.7 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;0.36&lt;br /&gt;Italy &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;      &lt;/span&gt;20.1 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;27.6 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;3.18&lt;br /&gt;Ireland &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;      &lt;/span&gt;16.4 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;28.1 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;3.18&lt;br /&gt;Netherlands &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;     &lt;/span&gt;20.7 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;28.3 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;3.18&lt;br /&gt;New Zealand &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;    &lt;/span&gt;25.4 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;28.3 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;6.35&lt;br /&gt;OECD total &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;     &lt;/span&gt;24.3 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;28.4&lt;br /&gt;Belgium &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;      &lt;/span&gt;22.6 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;29 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;   &lt;/span&gt;3.18&lt;br /&gt;Germany &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;     &lt;/span&gt;23 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;   &lt;/span&gt;29.2 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;3.18&lt;br /&gt;Australia &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;     &lt;/span&gt;25.2 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;29.8 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;5.72&lt;br /&gt;United Kingdom &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;    &lt;/span&gt;21.6 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;31.9 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;4.54&lt;br /&gt;United States &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;    &lt;/span&gt;24.8 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;33.1 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;3.2&lt;br /&gt;France &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;      &lt;/span&gt;27.1 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;33.3 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;3.18&lt;br /&gt;Luxembourg &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;     &lt;/span&gt;28.5 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;47.3 &lt;span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;3.18&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;div&gt;(file is OECD rates and size of the financial sector)&lt;br /&gt;There is probably a need for some dummy variables to account for the US reserve currency status, UK history and the developments in Ireland and Luxembourg.  What other explanatory variables? &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-7912863942115375845?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/7912863942115375845/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=7912863942115375845' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/7912863942115375845'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/7912863942115375845'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/01/interest-rates-and-financial-growth.html' title='Interest rates and financial growth'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-6941798076889609266</id><published>2010-01-28T08:54:00.001Z</published><updated>2010-01-28T08:54:35.122Z</updated><title type='text'>The carry trade</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f3aec6c2-b99e-11de-a747-00144feab49a.html"&gt;The FT explains&lt;/a&gt; the carry trade.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-6941798076889609266?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/6941798076889609266/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=6941798076889609266' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/6941798076889609266'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/6941798076889609266'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/01/carry-trade_28.html' title='The carry trade'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-3036391424931500995</id><published>2010-01-27T14:57:00.001Z</published><updated>2010-01-27T14:58:34.715Z</updated><title type='text'>Contagion</title><content type='html'>The &lt;a href="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/blogspot/epicureandealmaker/~3/xVPxcNGN9iM/on-bullshit.html"&gt;Epicurean Dealmaker&lt;/a&gt; highlight a way that contagion can spread from one market to another. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;Well, consider this. A fund with a highly levered balance sheet, and its investment fingers in many pies, is hit with losses in one of its sub-portfolios. Due to the nasty two-edged bite of leverage, its equity drops significantly, and the only way it can restore its risk profile is to raise more equity or liquidate some of its investments. Given the poor market conditions in the affected sub-portfolio, it is often more prudent to liquidate securities in other sub-portfolios. But this, as you can imagine, puts downward price pressure on securities in those previously unrelated markets. Presto, contagion. This is the "common holder" problem which some believe is the primary culprit.&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-3036391424931500995?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/3036391424931500995/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=3036391424931500995' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/3036391424931500995'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/3036391424931500995'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/01/contagion.html' title='Contagion'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-6490797250751707177</id><published>2010-01-20T21:32:00.002Z</published><updated>2010-01-20T21:34:29.175Z</updated><title type='text'>US bond auctions</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2b35ef66-05f9-11df-8c97-00144feabdc0.html"&gt;A very interesting item on US bond auctions&lt;/a&gt; and the way that indirect bidding has become more apparent.  &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;For the past year, as the size and number of US Treasury debt sales each month has surged in order to fund the gaping US budget deficit, there has been increasing evidence of “direct” buying activity. But last week the trend became particularly apparent when big chunks of the three and 10-year note auctions were bought by domestic investors such as large money managers, hedge funds and smaller US financial institutions.&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-6490797250751707177?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/6490797250751707177/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=6490797250751707177' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/6490797250751707177'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/6490797250751707177'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/01/us-bond-auctions.html' title='US bond auctions'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-3894765870922555635</id><published>2010-01-20T21:18:00.001Z</published><updated>2010-01-20T21:20:29.522Z</updated><title type='text'>Monetary policy</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://traxfer.ft.com/cms/s/0/8b2f2f0c-0515-11df-aa2c-00144feabdc0.html?o=%2Fmarkets"&gt;John Plender&lt;/a&gt; makes that point that monetary policy was asymmetric.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;The academics who dominate modern central banking were ideologically committed to the notion of efficient markets and to exclusive reliance on inflation targetting regardless of imbalances arising from easy credit and soaring asset prices – a spectacular case of one-club golfing. This mindset led to the silly belief that bubbles could not be identified at the time and that it was better to clean up after the bust than to lean pre-emptively against the wind in the boom. Monetary policy was thus asymmetric. Interest rates were reduced when asset prices fell, but were not raised in response to wildly overheating markets.&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-3894765870922555635?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/3894765870922555635/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=3894765870922555635' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/3894765870922555635'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/3894765870922555635'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/01/monetary-policy.html' title='Monetary policy'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9723303.post-7563055176275921690</id><published>2010-01-20T17:13:00.000Z</published><updated>2010-01-20T17:14:37.531Z</updated><title type='text'>Risk aversion</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://www.crownhill.ca/advancedalm-utilityreview.htm"&gt;Here &lt;/a&gt;is an excellent overview of risk aversion.  &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;Geometric Mean&lt;br /&gt;Another alternative to mean-variance is to select the portfolio that has the highest expected geometric mean return. This, in effect, maximizes the expected value of terminal wealth.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The geometric mean is defined as:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;where Rij is the ith possible return on the jth portfolio and each outcome is equally likely.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;If the likelihood of each outcome is different and Pij is the probability of the ith outcome for the jth portfolio, then&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;and can be written as,&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The resulting portfolio is usually very well diversified and extreme values have a tendency to be eliminated. If a strategy has a probability of bankruptcy then the whole product will become zero.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The geometric mean is a measure of central tendency, just like a median. It is different from the traditional mean (which we sometimes call the arithmetic mean) because it uses multiplication rather than addition to summarize data values. Geometric means are often useful summaries for highly skewed data.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The geometric mean for any time period is less than or equal to the arithmetic mean. The two means are equal only for a return series that is constant (i.e., the same return in every period). For a non-constant series, the difference between the two is positively related to the variability or standard deviation of the returns.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The main problem with this method is that it does not differentiate between investors and thereby does not explicitly refer to risk. If our expected return forecasts were the same, then every investor, irrespective of their circumstances, would hold the same portfolio.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Arguably, this method could be used by a mutual fund that has a broadly diversified group of investors. It is very quick and easy to use.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Maximizing the geometric mean is equivalent to maximizing the expected value of a log utility &lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/9723303-7563055176275921690?l=robhayward.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/feeds/7563055176275921690/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=9723303&amp;postID=7563055176275921690' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/7563055176275921690'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/9723303/posts/default/7563055176275921690'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://robhayward.blogspot.com/2010/01/risk-aversion.html' title='Risk aversion'/><author><name>Rob Hayward</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07408506131607521085</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry></feed>
