Saturday, November 19, 2011

Why Only Germany Can Fix the Euro | Foreign Affairs

At the heart of the Euro area crisis.

Why Only Germany Can Fix the Euro | Foreign Affairs:
" According to Eurostat, Germany's trade surplus with the rest of the EU grew from 46.4 billion euro in 2000 to 126.5 billion in 2007. The evolution of Germany's bilateral trade surpluses with the Mediterranean countries is especially revealing. Between 2000 and 2007, Greece's annual trade deficit with Germany grew from 3 billion euro to 5.5 billion, Italy's doubled, from 9.6 billion to 19.6 billion, Spain's almost tripled, from 11 billion to 27.2 billion, and Portugal's quadrupled, from 1 billion to 4.2 billion. Between 2001 and 2009, moreover, Germany saw its final total consumption fall from 78.5 percent of GDP to 74.5 percent. Its gross savings rate increased from less than 19 percent of GDP to almost 26 percent over the same period."

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Friday, November 18, 2011

Unintended consequences

The unintended consequences of trying to reduce the Greek debt burden while preventing the triggering of CDS has the unintended consequence of making all bond positions look vulnerable (even when there was a previous CDS protection. The FT quotes Commerzbank chief a:
"Mr Blessing criticised the Greek agreement since investors that insured Greek bonds using CDS had not received a pay-out because the voluntary agreement was not deemed to be a so-called “credit event” and thus did not trigger CDS payments."
This can lead to other bond holders selling the bonds because they find that they are not protected from default.

Saturday, November 12, 2011

Michael Lewis on Prospect Theory

Prospect Theory and MoneyBall
"The moment the psychologists uncover some new kink in the human mind, they bestow a strange and forbidding name on it (“the availability heuristic”). In their most cited paper, cryptically titled “Prospect Theory,” they convinced a lot of people that human beings are best understood as being risk-averse when making a decision that offers hope of a gain but risk-seeking when making a decision that will lead to a certain loss. In a stroke they provided a framework to understand all sorts of human behavior that economists, athletic coaches, and other “experts” have trouble explaining: why people who play the lottery also buy insurance; why people are less likely to sell their houses and their stock portfolios in falling markets; why, most sensationally, professional golfers become better putters when they’re trying to save par (avoid losing a stroke) than when they’re trying to make a birdie (and gain a stroke)"

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Unintended consequences

Unintended consequences: "In the UK, the “Merton Rule” – it originated in the Borough of Merton and has been widely emulated – demands that substantial new developments include the capacity to generate 10 per cent of the building’s energy needs through renewable sources, on site.

Alas, such a rule is hopelessly slack for an out-of-town supermarket – an environmental disaster because of all the driving it encourages, yet with plenty of real estate for solar panels. Meanwhile it is too challenging for a city-centre skyscraper, which is naturally a low-energy building because of its compactness and proximity to public transport."

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